Effects and After-Effects of the Carlos Alcaraz Drop Shot

Also today: Wild cards and doping bans; Miami preview podcast

Carlos Alcaraz in the 2022 US Open final

It is not easy to analyze the drop shot. Players don’t hit it very often, they sometimes hit it from very favorable or very unfavorable circumstances, and the goal of the shot sometimes extends beyond winning the point at hand. We can point to someone who hits droppers well and seems to win a lot of points doing so, but how much is the skill really worth?

Carlos Alcaraz is the poster boy for the modern drop shot. He loves to hit it–possibly too much–and when he executes, it’s one of the most stunning shots in tennis. At the business end of his Indian Wells campaign last week, he went to the well seven times against Alexander Zverev, ten times against Jannik Sinner, and three more in the final against Daniil Medvedev. He won 11 of those 20 points. That doesn’t sound so impressive, but Alcaraz could hardly complain about the end result.

To get a grip on drop shot numbers, we have a lot of work to do. What is a good winning percentage? Do any players suffer because they hit the drop shot too much? Is there a lingering effect from disrupting your opponent’s balance? Finally, once we have a better idea of all that, how does Alcaraz stack up?

Drop shot basics

To keep the data as clean as possible, let’s be specific about which strokes we’re looking at. While one can hit a drop shot in response to another drop shot (a “re-drop”), and it’s possible to hit a drop shot from the net in reply to a short volley or half-volley, those aren’t typically what we’re referring to. There are probably players (starting with Alcaraz!) who are better at that sort of thing than their peers, but those low-percentage recoveries aren’t today’s focus.

In this post, when I say “drop shot,” I mean a drop shot from the baseline, excluding all shots from the net, including responses to earlier drops.

The Match Charting Project gives us over 4,600 men’s matches to work with since 2015. Those 750,000 points include almost 35,000 drop shots. That works out to a drop shot in about 4.6% of points. Or from the perspective of a single player, it’s 2.3%, 1 out of every 44 points. The player who hits the drop shot ends the point immediately (via winner or forced error) about one-third of the time, and 19% of the droppers miss for unforced errors. Overall, the player who hits the drop shot wins the point 53.8% of the time.

From the 60 players with the most charted points to analyze, here are the 15 who win the highest percentage of points behind their drop shots:

Player                       Drop Point W%  
Kei Nishikori                        69.6%  
Richard Gasquet                      66.2%  
Nicolas Jarry                        65.3%  
Sebastian Baez                       63.2%  
Carlos Alcaraz                       62.1%  
Rafael Nadal                         61.3%  
Lucas Pouille                        60.3%  
Roger Federer                        59.7%  
Alejandro Davidovich Fokina          59.3%  
Roberto Bautista Agut                58.9%  
Marton Fucsovics                     58.2%  
Pablo Carreno Busta                  58.1%  
Jannik Sinner                        57.7%  
Dominic Thiem                        57.5%  
Andy Murray                          56.7%

Alcaraz does well here! Despite the presence of Kei Nishikori at the top, the list is heavily skewed toward clay-courters. Drop shots are a more central tactic on clay than on other surfaces, which works in both directions: Clay-courters are more likely to develop good drop shots, and players who have dangerous droppers are more likely to succeed on dirt.

Another skill that contributes to a spot on the list is good judgment. Nicolas Jarry doesn’t hit many drop shots, so he is probably picking the ripest opportunities when he does. There’s almost zero correlation between frequency of drop shots and drop shot success rate. Call it the Bublik Rule. From the same group of 60 tour regulars, here are the top 15 ranked by frequency:

Player                       Drop/Pt  Drop Point W%  
Alexander Bublik                7.2%          45.4%  
Benoit Paire                    5.4%          41.7%  
Carlos Alcaraz                  5.4%          62.1%  
Alejandro Davidovich Fokina     5.2%          59.3%  
Lorenzo Musetti                 5.1%          50.7%  
Holger Rune                     4.8%          50.9%  
Sebastian Baez                  3.9%          63.2%  
Robin Haase                     3.9%          55.1%  
Fabio Fognini                   3.7%          54.7%  
Matteo Berrettini               3.5%          52.0%  
Nick Kyrgios                    3.3%          54.9%  
Andy Murray                     3.3%          56.7%  
Novak Djokovic                  3.3%          50.4%  
Botic van de Zandschulp         3.2%          51.4%  
Frances Tiafoe                  3.2%          54.1%

Bublik may be turning things around: In the Montpellier final last month, he attempted 18 droppers and won the point 14 times. For a consistent high-frequency, high-success combination, though, we’re back to Alcaraz. Only Carlos, Alejandro Davidovich Fokina, Sebastian Baez, and Andy Murray (barely) appear on both lists.

Here are all 60 players in graph form. The top right corner shows players who hit a lot of drop shots and win most of those points. The closer to the bottom, the lower a player’s success rate; the closer to the left, the fewer droppers he attempts:

As a percentage of all points played, Bublik wins the most behind his drop shot. But it comes at a cost, since he hits so many of them, often sacrificing points because of it. If we assume that each drop shot is struck from a precisely neutral rally position, meaning that the would-be dropshotter has a 50% chance of winning the point, Bublik is losing points by going to the drop shot so often.

That’s a big assumption, and it probably isn’t exactly true for Bublik, or for anyone else. But if we stick with that for a moment, we can combine frequency and success rate into one number. Take the difference between success rate and 50% (that is, the gain or loss by opting for a drop shot), multiply that by frequency, and you get the percent of total points that the player wins by choosing the drop. The resulting numbers are small, so here’s the top ten (and bottom five) list showing points gained or lost per thousand:

Player                       Drop Pts/1000  
Carlos Alcaraz                         6.5  
Sebastian Baez                         5.2  
Alejandro Davidovich Fokina            4.9  
Richard Gasquet                        4.5  
Kei Nishikori                          3.8  
Lucas Pouille                          3.0  
Pablo Carreno Busta                    2.3  
Andy Murray                            2.2  
Roberto Bautista Agut                  2.2  
Rafael Nadal                           2.0  
…                                           
Jo Wilfried Tsonga                    -0.8  
Feliciano Lopez                       -1.3  
Aslan Karatsev                        -1.3  
Alexander Bublik                      -3.3  
Benoit Paire                          -4.5

Reduced to one number, Alcaraz is our dropshot champion. Six points per thousand doesn’t sound like a lot, but to invoke the familiar refrain, the margins in tennis are small. Beyond the top five or ten players in the world, one single point per thousand is worth one place on the official ranking list. Stars of Alcaraz’s caliber are separated by wider gaps, but it’s still a useful way to gain some intuition about the impact of these apparently miniscule differences.

The after-effect

In the hands of someone like Carlitos, the drop shot is a reliable way to win points. But the impact can go further than that. All sorts of tactics–drop shots, underarm serves, serve-and-volley–can theoretically be justified by some longer-term effect. If your opponent is camped out six feet behind the baseline and you want him somewhere else, a drop shot will surely give him something to think about.

This is hard to quantify, to put it mildly. How long does the effect of a drop shot last? Does it decay after each successive point? Does it disappear at the end of a game? On the next changeover? Ever? Jarry might need to hit the occasional drop shot to remind his opponent that he can do it, but Alcaraz doesn’t even need to do that. Everybody knows he’ll dropshot them, so he’s probably in his opponent’s head even before he hits the first drop shot of a match.

The evidence is unclear. About two-thirds of drop shots are hit by the server. I looked at the results of points immediately after a point with a drop shot, points two points later, and all the points that followed within the same game. When the server hits the drop shot, his win percentage on those subsequent points is worse than his win percentage on other points throughout the match–that is, non-dropshot points that didn’t follow so closely after he played a dropper:

Situation          Win%  
Next point        63.3%  
Two points later  62.6%  
Same game         62.5%  
All others        64.2%

I suspect that the dropshot effect (if there is one) is swamped by all the other influences at work here. Droppers typically occur in longer rallies, which might tire the server. The server might go for a drop shot when he runs out of ideas, another thing that might go through his mind as he prepares for the next point. This seems to work against Alcaraz more than other servers:

Situation          Win%  
Next point        62.0%  
Two points later  62.1%  
Same game         63.2%  
All others        65.0% 

The same pro-returner bias appears when we look at the results when it is the returner who goes for the drop shot. After seeing the numbers above, it’s tough to say that hitting a drop shot causes the higher success rate on subsequent points, but it is nonetheless a striking effect, especially for Carlitos:

Situation      Alcaraz W%     Tour W%  
Next point          44.0%       38.3%  
Two points later    41.8%       37.6%  
Same game           41.5%       37.9%  
All others          40.1%       35.8%

Whatever the mechanism here, it goes beyond “drop shot good, opponent confused.” More research is needed, and camera-tracking data would help.

Regardless of the after-effects (or lack thereof), the stats support the common contention that Alcaraz possesses a world-class drop shot. He might use it too often in some matches, and certainly there are individual situations in which he should have done something else. In the aggregate, though, the tactic is working for him. It produces more value than any other player’s dropper has done in the last decade. Tennis analytics is hard, but goggling at the game of Carlos Alcaraz is easy.

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Wild cards and doping suspensions

Simona Halep returned to action this week, thanks to a Miami wild card granted immediately after her doping suspension was reduced. Halep is well-liked, and there were few objections to her appearance in the draw. But Caroline Wozniacki, while careful to say she wasn’t specifically targeting Halep, said that she was against dopers getting post-suspension wild cards.

We’ve done this before. In 2017, Maria Sharapova returned from 15-month ban and immediately got a wild card to enter Stuttgart. The tennis world spent a few weeks in a dither about whether she’d get one to the French Open, too. She didn’t.

I wrote about the Sharapova situation at the time. I argued that Sharapova ought to get those opportunities. The reason I gave at the time was that it was better for the sport: She was one of the best players in the game, and fields would be more competitive with her than without her. Another reason is that without wild cards, it’s a long road back. Unranked after more than a year on the sidelines, a player needs to enter qualifying at ITFs, wait two weeks for those points to go on the official rankings (assuming they win!), and then use those rankings to enter (slightly) stronger events, with entry deadlines several weeks in advance of the tournaments themselves.

Climbing back up the ladder can take months. Is that part of the penalty? Is a 15-month suspension supposed to be 15 months of no competition, followed by 3-6 months of artificially weak, poorly remunerated competition? In team sports, this isn’t an issue, because coaches can put returning players in the lineup as soon as they’re ready.

As usual, the problem is that tennis doesn’t have unified governance. None of the various bodies in charge have an applicable policy. Sharapova was fine, and Halep will be fine, because stars get wild cards (if not as many as they would like), while lower-ranked players are stuck heading to Antalya to rack up ITF points. The discrepancy is particularly glaring in a case like that of Tara Moore, who missed 19 months but has been fully exonerated.

The WTA is apparently considering granting special rankings to players who have been cleared of doping charges or had their bans reduced, essentially treating them as if they are returning from injury. That’s better than nothing, but it wouldn’t address the more common scenario illustrated by Sharapova’s return.

I would go further and grant special rankings to any player returning from suspension. The term of the suspension is the penalty, period. Even better, and fairer to the field as a whole: Grant those special rankings in combination with a policy that restricts wild cards. For instance, Halep could have eight or ten entries into tournaments on the basis of her pre-suspension ranking, but no wild cards for her first year back. That way, individual tournament directors don’t need to re-litigate each doping ban, players have a predictable path to follow post-suspension, and superstars aren’t given any special advantages.

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Miami preview podcast

I had a fun conversation yesterday with Alex Gruskin, talking about my recent Iga Swiatek piece and previewing the men’s and women’s draws in Miami. Click here to listen.

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Katie Boulter’s Game of Patience

Katie Boulter in 2021. Credit: Chris Czermak

You can be forgiven if you didn’t have Katie Boulter on your radar going into the 2024 season. Her career-best ranking in the top 60 was a bit misleading, stemming largely from a debut title on the grass at Nottingham, where she picked up the championship without facing a single top-130 player. Nothing she can do about that, of course, but when it came to things she could control, the results were not always so encouraging. She wrapped up 2023, at 27 years of age, with a career total of just 25 hard-court victories.

Since then, it’s been a whole new Katie. She opened her campaign with an upset of 5th-ranked Jessica Pegula at the United Cup, and counting qualifying, she has won at least one match at six straight events. To solidify her new status, she won the title in San Diego last week, knocking out four seeded players in the process. Nothing cheap here: All five of her opponents were ranked in the top 36, and the weakest among them–Lesia Tsurenko–had won each of their three previous meetings.

After years in the ITF wilderness, relying on British grass-season wild cards for tour-level appearances, Boulter has earned a place in the WTA top 30. Thanks to the giant-killing in Southern California, her Elo rating backs it up, placing her 28th on tour, 26th on hard courts. The Brit has always had a first serve and forehand that made it possible to dream big. It has just been a matter of harnessing the big weapons and filling out her game with complementary parts that wouldn’t leave her exposed.

The results from San Diego suggest that she has finally done so. Commentators like to talk about the importance of playing “within” oneself, waiting for opportunities instead of swinging for winners when none are on offer. Boulter hasn’t always done that, and she has the unforced error totals to prove it. She found a better balance against last week’s barrage of top-40 foes, playing a bit more conservatively and cutting down mistakes without sacrificing too many winners. Now, she’s on everyone’s radar.

Katie bolt the door

Boulter ascended through the ranks with what might best be described as low-percentage tennis. In her 100+ matches on tour, she has landed just 57% of her first serves, racking up more double faults than aces. 13% of her groundstrokes are unforced errors, well above tour average. Her typical return point lasts just barely three strokes.

In twelve matches logged by the Match Charting Project before last week’s run in San Diego, a mixed bag ranging from ITFs in 2017 to her final-round victory over Jodie Burrage in Nottingham last year, her Rally Aggression Score worked out to 84, putting her in the same range as free swingers such as Caroline Garcia and Camila Giorgi. Against Burrage, her Rally Aggression Score was 267, a remarkable figure for a stat that I initially scaled so that it would max out around 100. Just about every possible shot–plus a few impossible ones–was a winner or unforced error. The average point in that match lasted just 2.9 shots.

It’s possible to win with numbers like these–just ask Aryna Sabalenka, Petra Kvitova, or Jelena Ostapenko. But the margins are slim. It’s particularly tough to thread the needle while making as few first serves as Boulter does. Surprisingly, she struggled on that front in San Diego, making just 54% of her first deliveries for the week, including a mere 51% against Emma Navarro in the semi-final. When only one-quarter of total points begin with your best shot, you can’t risk missing so much with the rest of your arsenal.

The Brit’s most effective step forward, especially against Kostyuk in Sunday’s final, was to keep herself in more return points. She has traditionally swung big on return, ending 11% of second-serve points with a return winner or forced error, and even finishing 6% of first-serve points that way. She didn’t sustain those numbers in the final, but the tradeoff was worth it. In those previous 12 charted matches, she put just 60% of first-serve returns in play, compared to a tour average closer to 75%. Facing Navarro, she kept the point alive on 65% of first serve returns; against Kostyuk, she put the ball back in play 79% of the time.

The result, more or less by definition, was longer return points. While the Burrage match was extreme, it is not uncommon for Boulter to average in the neighborhood of three strokes per point on return–still in Ostapenko territory. The San Diego semi was a wholly different animal, with her average return point lasting 4.5 shots. In the final, it was 4.1 shots. Such a radical shift would be a bad sign for many big hitters: Ostapenko and her ilk end points early because that’s the way they want to play. Yet Boulter thrived on her newfound patience.

The 27-year-old won 47% of her return points in San Diego, five percentage points better than her tour-level average and about the same as a typical performance from Pegula or Coco Gauff. On Sunday against Kostyuk, Boulter played 81 return points and won 40 of them.

Winners, slightly delayed

Even though she did not smack as many return winners as usual over the weekend, Boulter still won plenty of points from the baseline. She just took fewer risks in the process. Excluding aces and double faults, here’s a top-level comparison of the frequency with which she hit winners (plus forced errors) and unforced errors in her last two matches, compared with her previous charted matches and WTA average:

Match(es)    W+FE  UFE  
vs Kostyuk    14%   9%  
vs Navarro    19%   8%  
Previous      16%  13%  
WTA Average   12%  10%

The Navarro match was an unalloyed triumph, as you might expect from the 6-3, 6-1 scoreline. But even the Kostyuk numbers point to a major step forward. It’s not easy to cut down unforced errors from one side of tour average to the other, especially against someone like the Ukrainian, who feeds opponents an ever-shifting mix of speeds and depths. In the past, the Brit might have lost her rhythm and gone on an error spree. Instead, she was even steadier. On 28 key return points–game point, deuce, or break point–Boulter committed just one unforced error.

Facing women without the weapons to quickly end points themselves, Boulter discovered that a winner on the fourth or fifth shot of the point is just as effective, and less risky, than a big swing on the second or third shot. In her previous charted matches, she won about 49% of points that lasted four to six shots. Against Kostyuk, she won 76%, dictating play the way she has always preferred to do, just one or two shots later.

Presumably, it won’t always be quite this easy. Boulter won’t keep her unforced error rate in single digits forevermore; more aggressive opponents will tempt her into playing her old game. (Though the Brit did straight-set Donna Vekic in the quarters.) Still, she appears to have discovered new capabilities, seven years after her first appearance at Wimbledon. This year, she’ll likely return to the All-England Club as a seeded player, with all the expectations and pressure that entails. A decade into her pro tennis career, Boulter has earned herself a lot more attention.

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Welcome to the Show, Luciano Darderi

Luciano Darderi in 2023. Credit: jmmuguerza

Italian tennis hardly needs any more prospects, but Luciano Darderi has announced himself as yet another young player to watch. The Argentinian-born right-hander turns 22 today, three days after securing his debut ATP title. He came through qualifying in Cordoba, and in just his third appearance in a tour-level main draw, knocked out the 2nd, 4th, and 7th seeds en route to the championship.

Darderi is a supercharged clay courter, comfortable on dirt yet possessing a serve and forehand that will play on faster surfaces. He cracked 25 aces in the Cordoba main draw, plus another 11 in qualifying. On Sunday, fellow qualifier Facundo Bagnis got barely half of Darderi’s first serves back in play. Against Sebastian Baez in the semi-finals, the Italian ended 22 points with a forehand winner or forced error and, as we will see, held his own from the baseline against one of the game’s most stubborn defenders.

Though the magnitude of Darderi’s breakthrough came out of nowhere, he has been inching toward a double-digit ranking for some time. He reached 13 Challenger quarter-finals last year, advancing to three finals and collecting a pair of titles. He finished the year ranked 128th and gained 60 places with the victory in Cordoba, ensuring he’ll have plenty more chances to prove his mettle on tour.

He hasn’t hesitated to take advantage, dropping just three games in beating Mariano Navone in Buenos Aires yesterday. The victory extended the Italian’s winning streak to eight and shows just how fast he is developing, having lost to Navone in a bruising Challenger final just a few months ago.

It won’t always be so smooth for Darderi: The hard-court skew of the top level of the circuit may not prove hospitable to a youngster who has played 84% of his career matches on clay. Even with the right weapons in hand, it will take some time to become more than just a dark horse on the Golden Swing. But that’s all in the future: Darderi’s 22nd birthday is an ideal opportunity to dig into the upsets that lifted him from Challenger warrior to the top 100.

Bullying the little guy

The defining win of the Italian’s week in Cordoba was the semi-final. Baez struggled at the end of 2023, but he is always a tough out on clay, especially coming off a third-set-tiebreak victory in Davis Cup. At just five-feet, seven-inches tall, the Argentinian relies on speed and defense, neutralizing the weapons of larger men. It doesn’t always work–his serve puts him at an immediate disadvantage, and he can become overly aggressive and error-prone to compensate–but he doesn’t give much away.

Despite his size, Baez doesn’t mind going toe-to-toe with an opponent’s best shot. In 19 clay-court matches tracked by the Match Charting Project since the beginning of 2022, Baez’s opponents have hit forehands–excluding service returns–as 61% of their baseline shots, compared to a tour-wide clay-court average of 55%. Thomaz Bellucci found the forehand 72% of the time against the Argentinian; Tallon Griekspoor clocked in at 71%.

Both lost. No matter what the shot, if you find yourself in a rally with Baez, your odds aren’t good. When you hit a forehand after the service return, your chances of winning the point are 45%; with a backhand, your chances are 44%. (Tour averages on clay are 53% and 47%, respectively.) Some individual cases are downright comical. In the 2022 Bastad quarter-finals, Dominic Thiem won just 27% of points when he hit a forehand. When the two men met again in the Kitzbuhel final last year, Thiem relied a bit more on his backhand. Alas, he won only 14% of points when he hit one of those.

Darderi ran around a few backhands to find his bigger weapon, but he generally refused to take the bait. He waited for his spots to attack one of the toughest men on tour to be patient against. This table details the results he got from his forehands and backhands in the semi-final:

                   FH/GS  FH W%  FH Wnr%  FH UFE%  
Darderi vs Baez    55.4%  50.6%    12.2%     8.5%  
Average vs Baez    60.6%  45.2%    10.4%    12.0%  
                                                   
                   BH/GS  BH W%  BH Wnr%  BH UFE%  
Darderi vs Baez    44.6%  48.5%     6.1%     6.8%  
Average vs Baez    39.4%  43.8%     6.3%    10.3%

The Italian hit fewer forehands than the usual Baez opponent, and it won him more points, in part thanks to hitting winners at a higher rate and coughing up fewer unforced errors. His backhand numbers were favorable as well, perhaps in part because he set up for backhands in places where other opponents would go for an inside-out forehand. He was particularly stingy with free points on that wing.

Despite possessing the bigger gun, Darderi let his opponent make the mistakes. Baez obliged, piling up 32 unforced errors, including an uncharacteristic 11% of his backhands. Winning percentages of 50.6% and 48.5% hardly make for good headlines, but coupled with a big serve, they are enough to beat Baez. Few players on tour have been able to manage the same.

Tailored attack

The classic clay-court baseline weapon is the inside-out forehand, a salvo that might not end the point, but will pull the opponent out of position and leave the court open for a finishing blow. Darderi can win matches with that shot, as he did in the final against Bagnis. His left-handed opponent kept sending balls to his backhand corner, and the Italian ran around a lot of them. More than half of Darderi’s forehands in the final were inside-out, and he won the point 78% of the time he hit one. The match wasn’t close.

As we’ve seen, though, manufacturing forehands against Baez is a trap. The Argentinian can blunt the angle and absorb the pace, and meanwhile, his opponent is out of position. When Thiem had his terrible day in Bastad, he hit 62 inside-out forehands, only 16 of them in points that he won. (He typically wins more than half, as does the tour as a whole.) Whether by preparation or intuition, Darderi took those chances much less often, and far less frequently than he would against Bagnis. Just one in six of his forehands were of the inside-out variety, and he won just shy of half those points.

Instead, with Baez accustomed to playing defense on the backhand side, Darderi attacked to the forehand. While he didn’t go crosscourt particularly often, he hit hard when he did. 22% of his crosscourt forehands ended the point in his favor with a winner or forced error. That shot can be a slightly favorable play against Baez–opponents win 47% of those points, compared to 45% for forehands overall–but only Nicolas Jarry has cleaned up against Baez in this category the way that Darderi did. It’s way too early to draw any conclusions about how the Italian’s game will fare on tour, but when you share the top of a forehand leaderboard with Jarry, you’re doing something right.

A big serve and a forehand isn’t enough: Nearly everybody has those, even if Darderi’s forehand has a bit of extra mojo. Upsetting the forehand-neutralizing Baez, especially in between victories against less complicated opponents, is a sign that the Italian has resources between his ears as well. Every week, it seems, Italian tennis looks a little bit better.

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Felix Auger-Aliassime’s Achilles Heel

Also today: February 8-10, 1974

Felix Auger-Aliassime in 2023. Credit: aarublevnews

There may not be a more beautiful serve in tennis. When Felix Auger-Aliassime is hitting his targets, returners don’t have a chance. Auger-Aliassime has been particularly deadly on indoor hard courts, winning four such championships in 2022, then defending his Basel title last October.

Before returning to the winner’s circle at the Swiss Indoors, the Canadian’s 2023 season was one to forget. He struggled with a knee injury that knocked him out of Lyon and most of the grass-court season, where he would otherwise have figured to thrive. Between Miami–where he last reached his career-best ATP ranking of 6th–and Tokyo, he won just two matches in a dozen starts. We can’t hold much of that against him; when it wasn’t the injury, it was the recovery or the rust.

But he hasn’t played like a top-tenner in 2024, either. He lost to Daniel Altmaier to open his campaign, got dragged into a five-hour slog by Dominic Thiem in Melbourne, and then fell yesterday in Marseille to Zhang Zhizhen. The Chinese man, who lost to 1,107th-ranked Sebastian Dominko in Davis Cup last weekend, isn’t the sort of player who should threaten the likes of Auger-Aliassime, especially on an indoor hard court. Marseille has a reputation as a relatively slow surface for an indoor event, but according to my numbers, it played almost exactly as fast as Basel did last year.

With such a serve, the rest of Felix’s game should fall into place. But it hasn’t, and even the Canadian’s service games can get messy. Zhang broke him three times in ten tries yesterday, and he came close to a fourth. Last week in Montpellier, Auger-Aliassime saved just one of six break points before squeaking past Arthur Cazaux. Apart from an occasional glut of double faults, the serve itself rarely fails him. He reliably sends in aces on at least one of ten service points. Nearly one-third of his serves don’t come back. So what’s the problem?

The Canadian charge

There’s a certain style of play that has become recognizably Canadian, by some combination of the influence of Milos Raonic and the natural development of players who grow up practicing indoors. While Auger-Aliassime, Denis Shapovalov, and Leylah Fernandez–like Raonic before them–rarely serve-and-volley, they often venture far inside the baseline after serving. The move puts them in excellent position to swat away weak replies, at the cost of getting exposed by a deep return.

(The move also calls to mind Evonne Goolagong, perhaps the most casual serve-and-volleyer in the game’s history. Martina Navratilova said of her, “She didn’t serve-and-volley; she would sort of saunter-and-volley.”)

If Felix’s aggressive court position pays off, it should show up in his second shot stats. This may sound familiar, because I talked about the same thing in my piece about Sebastian Korda earlier this week. Though Korda’s serve isn’t quite the weapon that Auger-Aliassime’s is, the two men are similar in that their overall results don’t seem to reflect the strength of their opening deliveries. Korda, for all of his power, hits a second-shot (plus-one) winner or forced error 17% of the time that a return comes back, almost exactly in line with tour average.

Auger-Aliassime is similarly punchless. I ran the numbers again, this time back to 2019 instead of 2020, to capture most of the Canadian’s career. The plus-one winner rates are a bit different, but not enough to alter the story. I’ve also included more players for comparison:

Player                 Plus-one winner%  
Milos Raonic                      24.4%  
Denis Shapovalov                  21.5%  
Matteo Berrettini                 19.5%  
Carlos Alcaraz                    19.1%  
Holger Rune                       18.6%
Lorenzo Sonego                    18.4%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas                18.2%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime             17.6%  
Sebastian Korda                   17.3%  
-- Average --                     17.2%  
Jannik Sinner                     16.8%  
Daniil Medvedev                   16.3%

Given the potency of his serve and the positioning risks he takes, Auger-Aliassime finds himself in the wrong section of this list. He’s not as one-dimensional as Raonic, and he’s less explosive (and erratic) than Shapovalov, but couldn’t he play more like Berrettini? You might argue that Felix’s ground game is better than the Italian’s, and he can thrive without forcing the issue so quickly. That may be true–I believe the Canadian and his team think this way–but the numbers don’t bear it out.

Over their careers, Auger-Aliassime and Berrettini have hit unreturned serves at exactly the same rate. Yet the Italian wins two percentage points more often on his second shot. The overall picture is even more dramatic: Berrettini’s career tour-level rates of 69% serve points won and 88% service games held are each better than Felix has posted in any single season. Berrettini’s forehand is better, sure, but I can’t believe that accounts for the entire difference. The Canadian’s wait-and-see approach too often turns into a ten stroke rally that ends in favor of the other guy.

The Achilles heel

I promised you a weak spot of mythological proportions, and you’re going to get it.

The story of yesterday’s loss to Zhang was captured, oddly enough, in one of the service games that Felix won. At 1-3 in the second set, he raced to 30-love with two points straight from the textbook: big serve to the backhand, shallow reply, swat away a winner. He scored another classic plus-one at 30-15.

The two points he lost, though, show what happens when someone reads the serve, or when he misses the first serve and doesn’t do much with the second. At both 30-0 and 40-15, Zhang took advantage of a second serve to put the return at Felix’s feet. The first time, the Canadian could only keep the ball in play, and he lost a six-stroke rally. Two points later, Auger-Aliassime unforced-errored the backhand plus-one. He secured the hold with a better second serve at 40-30, but he isn’t always so lucky.

When returns land in the service box, Felix’s results are strong, even if he isn’t as aggressive as Berrettini or his fellow Canadians. Here are several stats profiling what happens to those weak replies: plus-one winner rates (P1 W%), plus-one error rates (P1 UFE%), and overall point winning percentage:

Player                 P1 W%  P1 UFE%  Pt W%  
Milos Raonic             43%      12%    64%  
Denis Shapovalov         36%      16%    60%  
Matteo Berrettini        34%      14%    60%  
Holger Rune              32%      13%    61%  
Carlos Alcaraz           32%      12%    66%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime    31%      13%    62%  
Sebastian Korda          31%      14%    61%  
Daniil Medvedev          30%       9%    63%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas       29%      11%    62%  
Lorenzo Sonego           29%      13%    57%  
-- Average --            28%      12%    60%  
Jannik Sinner            28%      11%    63% 

These numbers are from 2019 to present, so Raonic’s stats are probably a caricature of the tactics he used at his peak. Still, it seems like Auger-Aliassime ought to be ending a few more of these points immediately. Either way, there’s no reason to complain about his ultimate outcomes–he wins more of these points than Berrettini does, and almost as many as Daniil Medvedev or Jannik Sinner. (Side note: Holy Alcaraz!)

Here is the same set of stats for returns that are not so shallow, but are still closer to the service line than the baseline. (The Match Charting Project calls these “deep”–as opposed to “very deep” returns.)

Player                 P1 W%  P1 UFE%  Pt W%  
Milos Raonic             31%      12%    56%  
Denis Shapovalov         24%      16%    54%  
Holger Rune              23%      13%    60%  
Matteo Berrettini        20%      14%    54%  
Lorenzo Sonego           20%      14%    54%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas       20%      11%    58%  
Carlos Alcaraz           18%      13%    57%  
Sebastian Korda          17%      16%    55%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime    17%      13%    53%  
-- Average --            16%      12%    55%  
Daniil Medvedev          15%       9%    56%  
Jannik Sinner            14%      10%    56%

Take away a couple of feet of court position, and Auger-Aliassime’s results look awfully pedestrian. He still hits more plus-one winners than average, but barely, and at the cost of more errors. He wins fewer of these points than average, and fewer than anyone in this selected group of players. If we make the reasonable assumption that the returns coming back from Felix’s serves are weaker than average–even if they land in the same sector of the court–those middle-of-the-pack numbers look even worse.

I hope you’ve stuck with me, because you’re about to find out how to beat Felix. It’s not easy, but it worked for Zhang. Here’s how players manage against very deep returns–the ones that land closer to the baseline than the service line:

Player                 P1 W%  P1 UFE%  Pt W%  
Milos Raonic             15%      14%    47%  
Denis Shapovalov         12%      14%    50%  
Matteo Berrettini        12%      11%    52%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas       11%      10%    52%  
Holger Rune              11%      11%    51%  
Sebastian Korda          10%      10%    50%  
Lorenzo Sonego            9%      14%    53%  
-- Average --             8%       8%    51%  
Carlos Alcaraz            8%       7%    54%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime     7%       9%    47%  
Daniil Medvedev           6%       6%    54%  
Jannik Sinner             6%       7%    52%

Auger-Aliassime plays these points like he’s Medvedev, but his baseline game can’t support those tactics. He wins these points at the same rate as late-career, physically compromised Raonic.

This is, in large part, the cost of that aggressive court position. Some players, like Alcaraz, can get away with it. Raonic couldn’t, but he put away so many cheap points that he could live with the drawbacks. It’s exaggerating only a bit to say that Auger-Aliassime gets the worst of both worlds: He doesn’t pick up an unusually high number of freebies, but then he finds himself on the back foot whenever someone manages to land a deep return.

That was the story of Zhang’s upset win yesterday. When the Chinese player hit a shallow reply, Felix won 11 of 15. When the return landed behind the service line, the success rate fell to just 8 of 25. It isn’t always that bad, and even when it is, a uptick in unreturned serves (or a strong return performance) can salvage the day. But opponents will only get better at reading the Canadian’s serve, and perhaps they will recognize that they needn’t attempt any heroics as long as they place the return deep in the court.

Auger-Aliassime isn’t going to wake up one day able to play like Medvedev, however much he might like to. He can, however, choose to play more like Raonic or Berrettini. His current approach is probably good enough for a long stay in the top 20: Elo ranks him 17th, at least until it updates with yesterday’s loss. But if he hopes to crack the top five, he’ll need to do more with the profits from that gorgeous serve.

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February 8-10, 1974: Sideshows take center stage

For a week in February 1974, the women’s tennis circuit had to make do without Billie Jean King. Fortunately, George Liddy was ready to pick up the promotional slack, and then some.

The Slims tour headed to Fort Lauderdale for an event on Chris Evert’s home turf–or, more accurately, her home Har-Tru. Billie Jean didn’t like her odds on clay in enemy territory, so it was a good time for a week off. In her absence, Evert provided the drubbings, Rosie Casals delivered the controversy, and–fulfilling what one newspaperman called Liddy’s “kinky dreams”–none other than Bobby Riggs showed up to sell more tickets.

The biggest story of the week took place off the court. Liddy was promoting more than just the S&H Green Stamps Tennis Classic; he also organized a track exhibition for the Friday night of the tournament. The big attraction was Riggs, who came to town for a much-ballyhooed race against famous miler Jim Ryun. (Earning a living as a professional track star could be complicated: Ryun had taken part in a tennis exhibition the previous June.) Ryun was a world-record holder and Olympic silver medalist, so in true Riggs fashion, some handicapping was in order. The 55-year-old hustler would get a half-mile head start.

Bobby was old, but he wasn’t that old. On February 8th, after a track clinic, a marching band, a pole-vault exhibition, and a 100-meter dash featuring some football players, the real business of the evening got underway. Riggs emerged, accompanied by a phalanx of young women and sporting a portable microphone to spice up the eventual television broadcast. He made a side bet with Rosie Casals and jokingly pleaded with organizers for an even bigger head start.

Ryun ran a respectable 4:03, but he never caught up with America’s most famous male chauvinist. Riggs ran his 890 yards in 3:22 for an easy victory.

“I’d say he needed another 200 yards,” Ryun said.

As for Riggs, he hadn’t been working out much since the Battle of the Sexes the previous September. His assessment: “I don’t think I’ve ever been this tired.”

* * *

Casals was tired, too. She had spent most of the week griping: The tour came back to Florida too often, she didn’t like to play on clay, it was cold and windy, and the crowd was partisan to the point of rudeness when she faced Jeanne Evert in the second round. Another of her complaints–about thoughtless scheduling–had merit. After a late-night doubles match on Thursday, she was first up on Friday’s order of play.

As if that weren’t enough, her routine defeat of Francoise Durr earned her a place in the semi-finals against Chrissie herself. “Nobody’s unbeatable,” Rosie said. But on Saturday, she salvaged just one game. Casals had to settle for a lesser prize–a local columnist declared her the champion of the press room.

The final had unexpected potential. Evert had been expected to run away with the title, and she hadn’t done anything to call that forecast into question. But second-seeded Kerry Melville looked like she might just make it close, allowing just two games to Nancy Gunter in her semi-final. Melville herself had said that the chance of anyone beating the home favorite in Fort Lauderdale were “very, very slim.” But after a near-flawless match, she felt differently: “If I play like I played today, I think I have a good chance of beating Chris.”

Alas, it wasn’t to be. At the hotel on Saturday night, Melville walked to the bathroom in the dark and fractured her toe. She withdrew, and the title went to Evert.

Liddy, though, had another ace up his sleeve. Riggs was already scheduled to play an exhibition match on finals day, against Miami Dolphins quarterback Bob Griese and wide receiver Ron Sellers. Bobby would play one-on-two, and the crowd would get the full raincoat-and-umbrella handicapping show. Everyone would go home with a smile on their face.

The biggest draw of the day, though, was Liddy’s last-minute replacement. Refunds were available, but only two ticketholders asked for their money back.

To play Evert, the promoter brought in none other than Althea Gibson, the two-time Wimbledon champion who had been the world’s best player in the late 1950s. Gibson had since earned her living as a golfer and made occasional attempts at a tennis comeback now that the sport had gone pro. At age 46, no one expected her to upset Chrissie, and she didn’t, winning just three games. But she impressed nonetheless.

“I don’t think there is anyone in women’s tennis today that serves it with that much pure power,” Evert said. “I was really surprised.” Althea wanted a rematch. After all, as one fan shouted during play, Gibson won more games off of Chris than Casals did.

Rosie, though, could take one consolation from the finals-day slate. The crowd immediately took to Althea, the obvious underdog and a legend to boot. Finally, a stadium full of Florida tennis fans was cheering against an Evert.

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Is Sebastian Korda Making Progress?

Also today: Talking Tennis interview

Sebastian Korda in 2023. Credit: Hameltion

It wasn’t long ago that Sebastian Korda was considered one of the best prospects in the men’s game. He won a tour level title before his 21st birthday, then fell one match short at the 2021 NextGen Finals. He reached two more finals in 2022, then began 2023 with a near-miss, a momentous three-hour clash with Novak Djokovic in Adelaide that ultimately went to the veteran.

That result, plus a quarter-final run in Melbourne and another runner-up finish last October in Astana, nudged Korda up to a career-high ranking of 23. While he has since dropped the points from Down Under and fallen out of the top 30, my Elo ratings keep him in the top 25, just ahead of the man who defeated him in Kazakhstan, Adrian Mannarino.

This all represents a step forward for the American, especially since he struggled throughout last year with a wrist injury. Compared to expectations, though, it’s a bit underwhelming. Korda’s father, Petr, is a grand slam champion; Sebastian has said he’d like to surpass him and win two. At age 23, he has plenty of time to develop, but eight of the men ahead of him in the rankings–including three of the ATP’s top seven–are younger still. For all the veteran exploits we’ve seen in the last decade of the ATP tour, superstars tend to make themselves known at an early age.

Last night, Korda recorded his 100th tour-level victory, a milestone that reminds us how much he has accomplished in his budding career. The match itself, however, pointed at some of his limitations. The American edged out big-serving French qualifier Hugo Grenier in the Marseille first round, 6-3, 2-6, 7-6(3). The player Korda aims to be would have progressed with ease. As it happened, he won 89 points to his opponent’s 92, marred by an error-spattered string in which he lost seven straight games. Grenier played well, but he is ranked outside the top 150. Korda didn’t look much better.

What’s missing? The 23-year-old has all the tools to climb higher: a six-foot, five-inch frame; an overpowering serve including a hard slice delivery that looks as if it were inherited directly from his left-handed father; a flexible, assured backhand; and a willingness to step into the court to take control of points. To watch him play, there’s very little separating Korda from, say, Taylor Fritz, yet Fritz is a top-tenner. Is it just a matter of time until Korda closes the gap, or does his game need to change?

Progress report

Let’s start with the positive: Korda’s serve is getting the job done. Yesterday, more than one-third of his serves didn’t come back. That’s in line with the average of the several other charted matches from the last 52 weeks. Only a handful of men end the point so often with their first shot; Fritz and Ben Shelton top 30% but still trail Korda. In a losing effort against Hubert Hurkacz in Shanghai last fall, more than 45% of the American’s serves were unreturned.

Those numbers represent a major step forward. Facing Hurkacz at the Australian Open last year, fewer than one-quarter of his serves ended the point. Korda finished below the 25% mark in matches against Daniil Medvedev and Karen Khachanov at the same event, too. It’s ironic that he won that one against Hurkacz and lost in Shanghai, but there’s no counter-intuitive moral to glean: Unreturned serves are an incontrovertible good.

The 23-year-old’s results are less reliable when the ball comes back. Even when presented with an attackable return, Korda sometimes hesitates. In two matches against Hurkacz last fall, Korda didn’t hit a single plus-one winner or forced error behind the second serve. (The high rate of unreturned serves means that his best deliveries aren’t coming back as sitters, but that hardly means that the remaining returns are all so daunting.) Grenier put 21 second serves back in play yesterday, only one of which the American ended with his second shot. Despite the qualifier’s overt aggression–he occasionally swung wildly for winners against Korda’s seconds–the average point on Korda’s deal ran to 4.3 strokes, an unusually high figure for such a strong server.

Taking first and second serves together, how much does Korda sacrifice with his conservative-seeming mindset on plus-ones? I calculated the percent of 3rd shots (plus-ones) and 5th shots that went for winners or forced errors across all charted matches since 2020. Here are results for Sebi, plus those of a few comparable players and the tour average:

Player                 3rd W%  5th W%  
Hubert Hurkacz          19.0%   20.0%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas      18.5%   20.1%  
Taylor Fritz            18.2%   17.1%  
Sebastian Korda         17.1%   16.9%  
-- Average --           17.1%   17.3%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime   16.8%   17.1%

Korda is just not as aggressive as the more successful of his tall, big-serving peers. He out-winners Felix Auger-Aliassime, but I would argue (and will do so at length, one of these days) that the Canadian’s approach is holding him back, as well. It isn’t that Korda is entirely passive on the plus-one, but given the relatively weak return quality he faces, he should be putting away more than a tour-average rate of second shots.

There is, however, a reason for his unwillingness to swing bigger, and that’s where we’ll turn next.

Something wild

Here’s the same table with two more columns: one for each player’s unforced error rate on the 3rd shot of the point, and another for the unforced error rate on the 5th shot:

Player                 3rd W%  3rd UFE%  5th W%  5th UFE%  
Hubert Hurkacz          19.0%     12.8%   20.0%     11.8%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas      18.5%     11.4%   20.1%     10.2%  
Taylor Fritz            18.2%     11.1%   17.1%      8.8%  
Sebastian Korda         17.1%     13.8%   16.9%     12.3%  
-- Average --           17.1%     10.8%   17.3%     10.4%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime   16.8%     10.9%   17.1%     11.6%

Yikes! Korda is wilder on these shots than the other players, so much so that he ends more points with the plus-one shot than everyone on this list except for Hurkacz. Of players with some degree of tour-level success, only Marin Cilic misses more plus-ones. Denis Shapovalov and Alejandro Davidovich Fokina are roughly equivalent to Korda in this department.

We’ve taken a roundabout path to reach a more general fact about the American’s game: He misses a lot of shots. As a fraction of all groundstrokes, Korda ends points in his favor about 10% more often than the average ATPer. But he commits 20% more unforced errors. His plus-ones are of a piece with his entire ground game, even if they’re a bit wilder. Racking up so many unforced errors without a correspondingly large winner count means, by definition, that his baseline game is a liability. Only that big pile of unreturnable serves is keeping him above water.

Fortunately, Korda is still young, and his game is not set in stone. He missed 13% of his plus-ones yesterday, but that number is trending in the right direction. Here are his winner and unforced error rates on the third shot of the rally, as ten-match rolling averages going back to the 2021 NextGen Finals:

You don’t need a tour guide to spot the good news here. Korda’s plus-one error rate used to be outrageously high. It’s still higher than he like it to be, but it’s dramatically better, and getting it under control hasn’t cost him much on the other side of the ledger. As he puts the wrist injury fully behind him, there may be even more room for improvement.

The ceiling

I’ve focused on the serve–and Korda’s approach behind it–because that’s the side of his game that will determine how high he climbs. In his career at tour level, he has won 38% of return points, a figure that means he’ll break often enough to win matches when he serves well. Maintaining a 38% rate will get tougher as the quality of his opposition rises, but that may not be a problem: He has already excelled against top tier competition. As Alex Gruskin points out, he’s 18-21 against top-20 players, a record that indicates he’s already able to compete at that level, even if his results against the rest of the pack (and his health) aren’t consistent enough to support a corresponding ranking.

Korda may improve his return game, but if he is to crack the top ten and have a real shot at those two major titles, his serve will make the difference. In the last 52 weeks, he has won 66% of return points and held 83% of service games, numbers that place him among the top half of the top 50… but not much higher. The serve itself needs no improvement, as we’ve seen. The difference between Korda and someone like Fritz or Tsitsipas is what happens when the serve comes back. The 23-year-old is making progress, but he has more steps to take before he can reach the enormous potential that once seemed so assured.

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Talking Tennis interview

I recently spoke with John Silk of Talking Tennis, and in a one-hour interview ,we covered all things Tennis Abstract: how to get the most out of the site, Elo ratings, common beliefs about tennis stats, and the Tennis 128. Watch it here:

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How Diana Shnaider Beat Zhu Lin in Hua Hin

Also today: Bublik’s quartet of comebacks; top seed upset trivia

Diana Shnaider at the 2023 US Open. Credit: Hameltion

Diana Shnaider lost her place in the WTA top 100 after her first-round exit at the Australian Open. But before we had time to reevaluate her place on the prospect list, she hurled her momentum back in the other direction, going through the top three seeds in Hua Hin, Thailand, to win her first career tour-level title. (More later on the trivia aspect.)

The Russian left-hander is only 19 years old, and her new ranking of #73 places her fourth among all women under 21. (She’s also up to 76th on the Elo list, ranked among the top 70 on hard courts.) The only younger players ahead of her are Coco Gauff, Linda Noskova, and Mirra Andreeva. Gauff is already a major winner, and Andreeva is three years younger, the impossibly young sensation of the moment. Noskova, though, is just seven months younger; coming off a quarter-final showing in Australia, she has already cracked the top 30. Shnaider trails the Czech by some distance on the points table, but she is every bit as promising of a prospect.

Zhu Lin, the Chinese veteran seeded third in Hua Hin, was no match for Shnaider yesterday. A second-set tactical shift–and a delayed response from the Russian–sent the match to a decider, but when Shnaider adjusted and Zhu failed to offer any new problems, it became a race to the finish. The 19-year-old completed her sixth top-50 victory, collecting the trophy by the score of 6-3, 2-6, 6-1.

Shnaider’s response to the final-round challenge was a fitting end to the week. Her three seeded victims–Zhu, Magda Linette, and Wang Xinyu–play different styles of tennis. Each one, at times, threatened to derail the Russian’s own game. She doesn’t yet have the weapons to impose herself on a top-tier opponent; her game may never be quite big enough for that. But her ability to handle the variety on offer in Hua Hin is an encouraging sign that she is maturing as a player. It could be a very long time before she gives up her place in the top 100.

Pushing around

The Russian has described herself an aggressive player. “I never wanted to be a pusher,” she told Christopher Clarey. “I was always like: ‘OK, here’s the shot. I’m killing it.'”

She isn’t a pusher, but by the standards of modern-day women’s tennis, she isn’t particularly aggressive, either. Her serve isn’t big enough to dictate play: 80% of them come back, setting her equal to Elina Svitolina or Emma Navarro. She uses her groundstrokes as weapons in every direction, but she plays within herself and leaves winners on the table. She ends points a bit more often than the typical WTAer from the baseline in exchange for a tour-average rate of unforced errors. Her Rally Aggression Score, across six charted matches from the last year, is +13, slightly above the norm and similar to that of Maria Sakkari.

It’s tempting to label her a counterpuncher, especially after watching a highlight reel or two. The broadcast commentator for her first-round victory over Linette was reduced to sputtering “No way!” after one unlikely recovery; my own reaction was less printable. She’s extremely fast, deceptively so. Woe betide the opponent who approaches the net. A singles court is 27 feet wide, and Shnaider needs only a few inches.

But “counterpuncher” isn’t right either. She’s not a pusher, she’s a pusher-around. Her relatively flat crosscourt groundstrokes off both wings are daunting, especially the left-handed forehand. The Russian rarely squanders an opportunity to do something with a groundstroke, whether that means widening the court or dislodging her opponent from the baseline. She doesn’t go for broke, but there’s not much passivity in her approach.

Shnaider’s brand of pushing-around works best against an opponent with an exploitable backhand. Linette’s backhand was too steady, which is what made the first rounder the Russian’s closest contest of the week. (Each woman won 75 of the first 150 points before the knot was finally untied.) Against Wang Xinyu and Zhu Lin, the crosscourt forehand consistently took control of points:

MATCH          W/FE%  PointsWon%  
SF vs Wang       27%         76%  
FI vs Zhu        30%         66%  
-- DS Avg        20%         59%  
-- Tour Avg      14%         53%  
R1 vs Linette    22%         47% 

These numbers are for crosscourt forehands only. When she hits them, Shnaider ends points in her favor one-fifth of the time, and she came close to one in three yesterday against Zhu. More commonly, the pressure created by that stroke–not the individual shot itself–is what wins the point. The average WTA player picks up barely half of points in which they hit a crosscourt forehand. It’s just not an overwhelmingly offensive shot. Iga Swiatek wins 60% of those points; Aryna Sabalenka wins 58%. Shnaider, like Iga, wins nearly 60% of them, claiming two of three against Zhu and more than three out of four against Wang.

She’s not killing the ball, not most of the time anyway. But it doesn’t matter. Her crosscourt forehand is the tennis equivalent of death by a thousand cuts.

Adjustment periods

Shnaider’s game is a work in progress, no criticism for a 19-year-old who balanced college tennis with the tour for half of last year. She will almost certainly develop more power, especially on the serve, where there is a wide gap between her biggest strikes and her more pedestrian offerings. She will probably also learn to take more chances from the baseline, an adjustment that would give her more control over her own fate.

On a smaller scale, each one of her three seeded opponents last week threatened to take control of their encounters; each time, the left-hander recovered in time to advance.

Linette, as we’ve seen, had no problem with the barrage of crosscourt forehands. After Shnaider won the opening frame, the top seed roared back with a 6-1 second. From there, though, the Russian was a different player. She sent more first serves to the wide corners–reliable weapons for many a left-hander–which sealed the first game of the decider with the loss of just one point. She also moved away from the crosscourt forehand, letting Linette test her own backhand with crosscourt forehands of her own. At 30-40 in the Pole’s first service game of the decider, Linette hit her plus-one shot down the middle. Where Shnaider might prefer to attack crosscourt, she instead went inside-out, setting herself up for a backhand crosscourt winner on the following shot. Linette would break back in the following game, but her momentum was broken. Shnaider had opened up new tactical options and would take the third set, 6-1.

Wang’s threat was less serious, but it represents bigger dangers that the 19-year-old will face on tour. Shnaider won the first set easily, aided by Wang’s own mistakes. But the Chinese player brought her power under control at the beginning of the second, breaking for a 3-1 advantage. The fourth game demonstrated what a big hitter can do: Wang needed only five shots to reach 40-30. There wasn’t anything to push around.

While Wang wasn’t exactly dominant on serve, she was good enough. The only way to handle a (temporarily) unbreakable server is to take care of your own deal, and Shnaider did her best. She took more chances with first serves, seeing that number fall below 50%, compared to a usual rate above 60%. When she was able to extend rallies, she let Wang make mistakes. The second-set tiebreak ended with a combination of the two: At 4-5, Wang missed a swinging volley to end a 20-stroke rally. Two points later, Shnaider cracked a wide first serve that didn’t come back.

Zhu Lin proved to be the knottiest problem of the three top seeds, even if she didn’t play the best tennis. Though Zhu doesn’t have big weapons, she knows the dangers of passive tennis, especially against someone like Shnaider who will push her around. After the first set went to the Russian, 6-3, Zhu did everything she could to shorten points. For one set, it worked:

RALLY LEN  Shots/Pt  
Set 1           4.6  
Set 2           3.7  
Set 3           4.6 

Zhu picked up the second set, 6-2, in large part because Shnaider reacted so badly to the shift. After balancing winners and unforced errors in the first set, the 19-year-old hit just two winners against ten errors–including six on the forehand–in the second.

When the deciding set began, it was as if both players realized that Zhu couldn’t keep playing with borrowed tactics. Shnaider continued to put service returns close to the baseline–her Return Depth Index was 2.83, by far the best of the charted matches in her career so far–making it more difficult for Zhu to attack. Her forehand recovered, ensuring that she would keep points alive. A better player, or one with more experience, might have reacted to Zhu’s shift more quickly, but it is to Shnaider’s credit that she did so, so comprehensively, well before the clock ran out. The Russian concluded her title run with a 6-1 final set.

If the course of this week’s triumph is any indication, Shnaider’s march to the top of the rankings will be a steady one. She has too much to figure out before she consistently beats the best, and that will take time. But her run of upsets in Hua Hin showed us that she is making progress, and that her in-match problem-solving skills far surpass those of the typical 19-year-old. As the problems get tougher, we’ll find out just how far she can go.

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Alexander Bublik’s four comebacks

Alexander Bublik won the Montpellier title the hard way, coming back from one-set deficits against all four of his opponents. It’s the first time anyone has ever won an ATP title despite losing the first set of each of his matches. It’s never happened on the Challenger tour, either.

However, the key word here is four. Bublik was the second seed in Montpellier, so he didn’t have to play a first-round match. No titlist has ever lost the first set in all of their matches, but many players have won a tournament despite losing four first sets.

I found 20 previous occasions when a player came back so often at the same event, en route to a title. (Presumably there are even more, if we look for finalists, quarter- and semi-finalists at majors, and so on.) Bublik was the first since 2009, when Radek Stepanek recorded back-to-back wins against Andy Roddick and Mardy Fish to claim the San Jose title. He recovered from a one-set deficit four times, straight-setting only Chris Guccione.

The feat was more common at the beginning of the century, occuring twice each in 2001 and 2002. Tommy Haas recorded four comebacks on the way to a title at the 2001 Stuttgart Masters, the single Masters-level title run on this list. His only straight-set victory was the best-of-five final against Max Mirnyi. Nicolas Escude won Rotterdam in 2002 against an all-star cast including Roger Federer, Juan Carlos Ferrero, Tim Henman, Sebastien Grosjean, and Tommy Robredo, losing the first set to all but Robredo. Don’t be too hard on Tommy, though: He took the first set from Paul-Henri Mathieu in Moscow the same year, where Mathieu dropped four first sets yet still took home the trophy.

Two major winners appear on this list: John McEnroe for his 1981 US Open run, and Andre Agassi for his 1992 championship at Wimbledon (where, in another coincidence, he beat McEnroe in the semis). Those feats aren’t really in the same category as Bublik’s, as they had seven chances to come back. On the other hand, McEnroe recovered from a one-set deficit against Bjorn Borg, so I’m not about to disqualify him from anything.

Finally, there’s one oddball occasion that–if you squint hard enough–really is a precedent for Montpellier last week. Emilio Sanchez led Spain to the 1992 World Team Cup title, beating Stefan Edberg, Guy Forget, and Jakob Hlasek in the round robin, then defeating Petr Korda in the final round. In each one, he came back after losing the first set. It’s not quite the same thing, but Sanchez went home a hero, and he came back in all four of his matches. Whether it qualifies or not, it was one hell of a week.

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Shnaider’s top-three upsets

As I mentioned at the top of today’s post, Diana Shnaider went through the first, second, and third three seeds in Hua Hin en route to the title. (Unlike Bublik, she won all five of her first sets, too.) She beat top seed Magda Linette in the first round, third-seeded Wang Xinyu in the semi-finals, and second seed Zhu Lin in the final.

Shnaider’s feat is not so rare as Bublik’s. Excluding year-end tour championships, where seeds clash in every match, Hua Hin is the sixth time in a decade that player has gone through the top three seeds to win the title. Remarkably, Barbora Krejcikova has done it twice in two years, beating Anett Kontaveit, Belinda Bencic, and Beatriz Haddad Maia to win Tallinn in 2022, then upsetting Aryna Sabalenka, Jessica Pegula, and Iga Swiatek (not to mention seventh-seed Daria Kasatkina and twelvth-seed Petra Kvitova) to win Dubai last year.

The list of previous such winners is a glittering one, usually when a superstar returns from a prolonged absence. Serena Williams beat Martina Hingis, Jennifer Capriati, and sister Venus to win Miami in 2002. Steffi Graf won the 1999 French Open by knocking out Lindsay Davenport, Monica Seles, and Hingis in succession.

Graf wasn’t the first player to win a major title in such a fashion: Virginia Wade picked up the first US Open, in 1968, by eliminating Judy Tegart, Ann Jones, and Billie Jean King.

Conchita Martinez is probably the best player who won a title this way when she was still on the rise: She upset Sabrina Goles, Katerina Maleeva, and Barbara Paulus to pick up the 1988 Sofia crown. Hana Mandlikova, like Krejcikova, did it twice: At the 1984 Oakland tourney, she beat Andrea Jaeger, Pam Shriver, and Martina Navratilova. She returned the next year and did it again, knocking out Wendy Turnbull, Helena Sukova, and Chris Evert.

Finally, a twist: Margaret Court also appears on the list twice. Shortly after returning from her first pregnancy, she won the 1972 Newport title–where she was seeded sixth–with victories over Rosie Casals, Evert, and King. The odder instance is her other appearance, for the Locust Valley (New York) event in 1969. Court plowed through top seeds Denise Carter, Patti Hogan, and Betty Ann Grubb, losing just 12 games in the process.

Margaret had already won two majors that year–so why wasn’t she the top seed? Traditionally, foreign players were placed on a separate seeding list. Carter, Hogan, and Grubb were the top three Americans at the rather weak event. Court was designated 1F–the top foreign seed, ahead of 2F Kerry Harris, with whom she won the doubles, too. Foreign seeds were placed in the draw so they would avoid local seeds (and each other) until later rounds. So this example doesn’t really count: By modern standards, Court was herself the top seed, and Harris probably outranked one or more of the Americans.

Even if we toss out Locust Valley, Shnaider finds herself in good company. She joins Wade, Court, Mandlikova, Martinez, Graf, Amelie Mauresmo, Serena, and–thanks to a sparkling week in Luxembourg in 2016–the great Monica Niculescu.

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What Is Going Wrong For Novak Djokovic?

Also: Arina Rodionova (probably) in the top 100

Novak Djokovic practicing at the 2023 US Open. Credit: Amaury Laporte

Fifteen break points. A week has passed, a new champion has been crowned, and I still can’t stop thinking about it. In the first two sets of his Australian Open quarter-final match against Taylor Fritz, Novak Djokovic failed to convert fifteen straight break points.

It’s so far out of character as to defy belief. Djokovic has converted more than 40% of his break chances in the past year, even counting the 4-for-21 showing in the entire Fritz match. The American, one of the better servers on tour, typically saves only two-thirds of the break points he faces. The chances that Novak would come up short 15 times in a row are about one in seven million.

Even stranger, it wasn’t because Fritz served so well. He missed his first serve on 7 of the 15 break points. He hit two aces and another four didn’t come back, but that leaves nine rallies when–under pressure, in Australia–Taylor Fritz beat Novak Djokovic. Five of those lasted at least seven strokes, including a 25-shot gutbuster at 4-3 in the second set that was followed, two points later, by yet another Fritz winner on the 17th shot. All credit to the American, who walked a tightrope of down-the-line backhands and refused to give in to an opponent who, even in the first two sets, was outplaying him. But clearly this wasn’t a matter of Fritz intimidating or otherwise imposing himself on Novak.

There’s no shortage of explanations. Djokovic is recovering from a wrist injury that hampered him in his United Cup loss to Alex de Minaur. He apparently had the flu going into the Melbourne semi against Jannik Sinner. The whole Australian adventure might be nothing more than a health-marred aberration; in this interpretation, none of Jiri Lehecka, Dino Prizmic, Alexei Popyrin, or even Fritz would otherwise have taken a set from the all-time great.

But… the man is 36 years old. If other tennis players his age are any guide, he may never be fully healthy again. He will continue to get slower, if only marginally so. He personally raised the physical demands of the sport, and finally, a younger generation has accepted the challenge. Djokovic has defied the odds to stay on top for as long as he has, but eventually he will fade, even if that means only a gentle tumble out of the top three. After a month like this, we have to ask, is it the beginning of the end?

Rally intolerance

The two marathon break points that Fritz saved were not exceptions. 64 of the 269 points in the quarter-final reached a seventh shot, and the American won more than half of them. Even among double-digit rallies, the results were roughly even.

Here’s another data point: Djokovic fought out 53 points in his first-rounder against Prizmic that reached ten shots or more. The 18-year-old Croatian won 30 of them. Yeah, Prizmic is a rising star with mountains of potential, but he’s also ranked 169th in the world. This is not the Novak we’ve learned to expect: Even after retooling his game around a bigger serve and shorter points, he remained unshakeable from the baseline, his famous flexibility keeping him in position to put one more ball back in play.

Down Under, though, those skills went missing. Based on 278 charted matches since the start of 2015, the following table shows the percentage of points each year that he takes to seven shots or more, and his success rate in those rallies:

Year  7+ Freq  7+ Win%  
2015    23.3%    54.9%  
2016    26.7%    53.1%  
2017    29.1%    53.3%  
2018    24.4%    52.6%  
2019    25.0%    55.1%  
2020    26.0%    54.3%  
2021    23.8%    53.6%  
2022    23.2%    54.7%  
2023    23.4%    54.1%  
2024    26.0%    49.8%

By the standards of tennis’s small margins, that’s what it looks like to fall off a cliff. The situation probably isn’t quite so bad: The sample from 2024 is limited to only the matches against Lehecka, de Minaur, Prizmic, Fritz, and Sinner. On the other hand, matches charted in previous years also skew in favor of novelty, so upsets, close matches, and elite opponents are overrepresented there too.

It is especially unusual for Djokovic to see such a decline on hard courts. Over the last decade, he has gone through spells when he loses more long rallies than he wins. But they typically come on clay. Carlos Alcaraz shut him down in last year’s Wimbledon final as well, winning 57% of points that reached the seventh shot and 63% of those with ten or more strokes. The only period when hard-court Novak consistently failed to win this category was late 2021, when Medvedev beat him for the US Open title (and then outscored him in long rallies in Paris), and Alexander Zverev won 62% of the seven-plusses (and 70% of ten-plusses!) to knock him out of the Tour Finals.

Protracted rallies are a young man’s game, and Djokovic’s results are starting to show it. Before dissecting Alcaraz in Turin last November, Novak had never won more than half of seven-plusses against Carlitos. He has barely held on against Sinner, winning 43% of those points in their Tour Finals round-robin match and 51% at the Davis Cup Finals. In 13 meetings since 2019, Medvedev has won more of these long rallies than Djokovic has. Zverev, too, has edged him out in this category since the end of 2018.

Against the rest of the pack, Djokovic manages just fine. He dominates seven-plusses against Casper Ruud and Stefanos Tsitsipas, for instance. But it’s one of the few chinks in his armor against the best, and if January represents anything more than the temporary struggles of an ailing star, more players are figuring out how to take advantage.

Avoiding danger

For players who lose a disproportionate number of long points, the best solution is to shorten them. Djokovic may never have thought in exactly those terms, but perhaps with an eye toward energy conservation, he has done exactly that.

Especially from 2017 to 2022, Novak drastically reduced the number of points that reached the seven-shot threshold:

In 2017, 29% of his points went that long; in 2022 and 2023, barely 23% did. It remains to be seen whether January 2024 is more than a blip. In his up-and-down month, Novak remained able to control his service points, but he was less successful avoiding the grind on return. As we’ve seen, that’s dangerous territory: Djokovic won a healthy majority of the short points against Fritz but was less successful in the long ones, especially following the American’s own serve.

Much rests on the direction of these trends. If the players Djokovic has faced so far this year can prevent him from finishing points early, how will he handle Medvedev or Zverev?. If Novak can’t reliably outlast the likes of Fritz and Prizmic, what are his chances against Alcaraz?

Djokovic is well-positioned to hold on to his number one ranking until the French Open, when he’ll be 37 years old. By then, presumably, he’ll be clear of the ailments that held him back in Australia. Still, holding off the combination of Sinner, Alcaraz, Medvedev, Zverev, and Father Time will be increasingly difficult. The 24-time major champion will need to redouble the tactical effort to keep points short and somehow recover the magic that once made him so implacable in the longest rallies. Age is just a number, but few metrics are so ruthless in determining an athlete’s fate.

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Arina Rodionova on the cusp of the top 100

In December, Australian veteran Arina Rodionova celebrated her 34th birthday. Now she’s competing at the tour-level event in Hua Hin this week, sporting a new career-best ranking of 101. With a first-round upset win over sixth-seed Yue Yuan, she’s up to 99th in the live rankings. Her exact position next Monday is still to be determined–a few other women could spoil the party with deep runs, or she could climb higher with more victories of her own–but a top-100 debut is likely.

Rodionova, assuming she makes it, will be the oldest woman ever* to crack the top 100 for the first time. The record is held by Tzipi Oblizer, who was two months short of her own 34th birthday when she reached the ranking milestone in 2007. Rodionova will be just the fifth player to join the top-100 club after turning 30.

* I say “ever” with some caution: I don’t have weekly rankings before the mid-80s, so I checked back to 1987. Before then, the tour skewed even younger, so I doubt there were 30-somethings breaking into the top 100. But it’s possible.

Here is the list of oldest top-100 debuts since 1987:

Player                    Milestone  Age at debut  
Arina Rodionova*         2024-02-05          34.1  
Tzipi Obziler            2007-02-19          33.8  
Adriana Villagran Reami  1988-08-01          32.0 
Emina Bektas             2023-11-06          30.6  
Nuria Parrizas Diaz      2021-08-16          30.1  
Mihaela Buzarnescu       2017-10-16          29.5  
Julie Ditty              2007-11-05          28.8  
Eva Bes Ostariz          2001-07-16          28.5  
Maryna Zanevska          2021-11-01          28.2  
Ysaline Bonaventure      2022-10-31          28.2  
Mashona Washington       2004-07-19          28.1  
Laura Pigossi            2022-08-29          28.1  
Maureen Drake            1999-02-01          27.9  
Hana Sromova             2005-11-07          27.6  
Laura Siegemund          2015-09-14          27.5

* pending!

I extended the list to 16 places in order to include Laura Siegemund. She and Buzarnescu are the only two women to crack the top 100 after their 27th birthdays yet still ascend to the top 30. The odds are against Rodionova doing the same–the average peak of the players on the list is 67, and the majority of them achieved the milestone a half-decade earlier–but you never know.

A triumph of scheduling

Rodionova has truly sweated her way to the top. She played 105 matches last year, winning 78 of them, assembling a haul of seven titles and another three finals. When I highlighted the exploits of Emma Navarro a couple of weeks ago, I couldn’t help but draw attention to the Australian, who is one of only two women to win more matches than Navarro since the beginning of last year. Iga Swiatek is the other.

Most of the veteran’s recent triumphs–44 match wins and five of her seven 2023 titles–have come at the ITF W25 level. She didn’t beat a single top-200 player in those events, and she faced only five of them. In her long slog through the tennis world last year, Rodionova played just one match against a top-100 opponent, and that was a loss to 91st-ranked Dalma Galfi.

The point is, the Aussie earned her ranking with quantity, not quality. No shame in that: The WTA made the rules, and the Australian not only chose a schedule to maximize her chances of climbing the ranking table, she executed. Kudos to her.

What her ranking does not mean, however, is that she is one of the 100 best players in the world. Elo is a more reliable judge of that, and going into this week, the algorithm ranks her 207th. (She peaked in the 140s, back in 2017.) You can hack the WTA rankings with a punishing slate of ITFs, but it’s much harder to cheat Elo.

Here are the players in the official top 150 who Elo considers to be most overrated:

Player             Elo Rank  WTA Rank  Ratio  
Caroline Dolehide       124        41    3.0  
Peyton Stearns          145        54    2.7  
Arantxa Rus             103        43    2.4  
Tatjana Maria            94        44    2.1  
Arina Rodionova         207       101    2.0  
Laura Pigossi           221       114    1.9  
Elina Avanesyan         120        62    1.9  
Varvara Gracheva         89        46    1.9  
Nadia Podoroska         127        67    1.9  
Lucia Bronzetti         109        58    1.9  
Dayana Yastremska        54        29    1.9

Once you climb into the top 100, savvy scheduling is increasingly impractical. Instead, this kind of gap comes from a deep run or two combined with many other unimpressive losses. Caroline Dolehide reached the final in Guadalajara followed by a quarter-final exit at a WTA 125, then lost three of five matches in Australia. Arantxa Rus won the title in Hamburg and reached a W100 semi-final, then lost five of six. The WTA formula lets you keep all the points from a big win for 52 weeks; Elo takes them away if you don’t keep demonstrating that you belong at the new level.

The sub-200 Elo rank suggests that Rodionova will have a hard time sustaining her place on the WTA list once the ranking points from her W25 titles start to come off the board. Until then, she can continue to pad her total and–fingers crossed–enjoy the hard-earned reward of a double-digit ranking.

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How To Play One-Set Shootouts Like Daniil Medvedev

Daniil Medvedev in 2023, practicing… something. Credit: Hameltion

In yesterday’s Australian Open quarter-final match against Hubert Hurkacz, Daniil Medvedev came through with his second five-set win of the tournament. In the decider, Hurkacz’s level dropped, Medvedev kept his ground game tight, and the Russian converted the one break point on offer. Four hours of tennis, compressed into a few crucial moments, and Medvedev has a place in the semi-finals.

Not long ago, Medvedev gained a reputation as a disappointment in deciding sets. He lost 11 of 15 three- and five-setters in 2022, and yesterday’s match was the first time in nine tries–going back to Melbourne two years ago–that he had beaten a top-ten player in a climactic set.

But such trends are easy to exaggerate. For one, three of those eight consecutive losses were clustered at the 2022 Tour Finals, where the Russian managed, remarkably, to drop third-set tiebreaks in all of his round-robin matches. Not the best way to ensure a restful offseason, but hardly an indictment of his ability to hang around late into matches with the best players in the game.

Further, except for the 2022 season, Medvedev has developed a knack for cleaning up close matches with everybody else:

Year   Decider W-L  Decider W%  
2024           2-0      100.0%  
2023          14-6       70.0%  
2022          4-11       26.7%  
2021          14-5       73.7%  
2020           9-4       69.2%  
2019         10-11       47.6%  
2018          16-9       64.0%  
2017          13-6       68.4%  
2016          23-9       71.9% 
---- 
Total       105-61       63.3%

2016 shouldn’t really count, since it’s a mix of ITFs, Challengers, and early forays onto the main tour, but given the results, I figured it was worth including. Wherever you draw the line, it’s hardly the case that Medvedev struggles in such matches. Recently, I looked into what a player’s third-set record “should” be, given their skill level, and a mark above 60% is better than expected for nearly anyone.

You might argue that the Russian shouldn’t have racked up so many deciders. He was expected to finish off Emil Ruusuvuori much more quickly than he did in the second round in Australia, and even on clay, he should never have gotten dragged to a fifth set at Roland Garros by Thiago Seyboth Wild, much less lost it. But everyone takes the scenic route sometimes. 14 of Medvedev’s deciding sets last year came against the top 50, 10 of them against the top 20.

The final set shift

When a match is reduced to a one-set shootout, it becomes a bit less serve-centric. This is a persistent finding in all high-pressure situations, from tiebreaks to break points to fifth sets. Servers get a bit more cautious, returners heighten their focus, and quick points are harder to come by.

The effects are small but real. In the 1,200-plus men’s deciding sets since 2017 logged by the Match Charting Project, servers win 1.1% fewer points in the final set that they did in the first two or four. They land fractionally more of their first serves, but only by increasing their margins: The percent of unreturned serves falls by more than 5%. The average rally increases from 4.1 strokes to 4.3.

There are two fundamental ways to benefit from those changes. First, you can buck the trend, continuing to serve big while your opponent succumbs to the natural tendency toward caution. That’s part of the reason that John Isner and Roger Federer were two of the very few players to win more tiebreaks than expected over long periods of time. It’s not easy, especially if fatigue is setting in. But if you can keep serving the way you did for two or four sets, you have a minor edge in the decider.

Second, you can be the type of player who excels in deciding-set-style tennis. If you had to pick between Medvedev and Hurkacz in a contest where more serves would come back and points would last longer, the choice is simple, right? It’s no guarantee, to be sure: The shift is a minor one, and it may not show up in any given match. Yesterday, more points were decided in four shots or less in the fifth set than in the first four. But on average, the trend moves in the other direction, right into the Russian’s wheelhouse.

Evidence shows that Medvedev follows these prescriptions, maintaining his attack on serve while taking advantage of more cautious opponents. Other top players, to varying degrees, do the same.

Let’s start with the basics. For each stat, I calculated every player’s performance in deciding sets, and in all previous sets. The numbers I’m about to show you are the ratio between those numbers, a measure of how much their tactics change when the final set begins. Positive numbers mean they do more of it in the decider, negative means they do less. We’ll look at the four Australian Open semi-finalists, plus Carlos Alcaraz (because of course) and Hurkacz (because of his deciding-set notoriety). Keep in mind that Novak Djokovic’s figures are limited to matches since 2017.

Here are the rate of serve points won, and the rate of first serves in:

Player             SPW%  1stIn%  
Carlos Alcaraz     3.9%    4.4%  
Jannik Sinner      2.6%   -1.2%  
Novak Djokovic     1.5%   -1.1%  
Hubert Hurkacz     0.8%   -1.9%  
-- Average --     -1.1%    0.7%  
Daniil Medvedev   -1.2%   -1.7%  
Alexander Zverev  -4.5%    3.2%

Medvedev is in line with tour average when it comes to winning service points: He doesn’t hold on to as many in deciding sets. Average isn’t bad in this case, though it looks mediocre in this company. A more encouraging sign, at least in terms of the tactical approach, is the change in first serves in. The Russian, in line with Djokovic, Hurkacz, and Jannik Sinner, seems to take a few more chances in the shootout. Alcaraz defies gravity, serving more conservatively yet winning more points, and Zverev looks out of place, a caricature of prudence.

Now let’s look at the percentage of serves that don’t come back (Unret%), as well as the percent of service points won in three shots or less (SPW% <=3):

Player            Unret%  SPW% <=3  
Novak Djokovic     10.9%      5.4%  
Carlos Alcaraz      0.2%      1.0%  
Daniil Medvedev    -0.6%     -2.0%  
Hubert Hurkacz     -1.1%      0.2%  
-- Average --      -5.7%     -3.6%  
Jannik Sinner      -7.4%      0.3%  
Alexander Zverev  -13.4%    -11.2%

The first rule of writing about men's tennis: Whatever the topic, you'll eventually end up showering praise on Djokovic. In recent years, he has learned how to get more out of his serve, and he turns that knob even further in deciding sets. Most players struggle to simply stay above water in the final set; Djokovic starts serving bigger.

Medvedev's rate of unreturned serves is the sort of positive sign it takes a connoisseur to appreciate: "-0.6%" doesn't turn up on many Hall of Fame plaques. But when the typical player serves so much more carefully, the Russian's consistency works to his advantage. His three-shots-or-less win rate does not stand out as much, but it is still less of a step backward than the typical tour player takes.

Once again, deciding-set Alexander Zverev is an unusual beast.

Opportunistic returning

If the challenge on serve is to keep attacking in the final set, the task on return is to take advantage of an opponent who probably isn't doing that. Ideally, that might mean more aggression on the return, but a 1% or 5% weaker first serve is still only so playable. Instead, players should make sure not to squander the chances they're given: Make more returns, then tighten up the ground game for the inevitable rallies.

Here are three stats to illustrate deciding-set return tendencies, again expressed as ratios between how each player performs in the final set, compared to previous sets:

Player            Ret InPlay%  UFE/Pt    FH%  
Alexander Zverev         6.7%    1.1%   1.0%  
Daniil Medvedev          3.9%   -3.2%  -1.2%  
Novak Djokovic           3.0%  -10.5%   1.5%  
Hubert Hurkacz           2.9%   -1.7%   0.3%  
Carlos Alcaraz           2.7%  -10.4%  -1.9%  
-- Average --            2.5%   -2.4%  -0.3%  
Jannik Sinner           -1.2%    0.1%   0.4%

Zverev, as we might have guessed, gets a lot of deciding-set returns in play. He's exceedingly conservative by every other measure we've seen, so why not here? Behind him, heading the non-pusher category, is Medvedev, who gets nearly 4% more returns in play in the final set that he did up to that point.

Unlike Zverev, the Russian also stays in control throughout the rally. He doesn't suddenly discover the otherworldly control of Djokovic and Alcaraz, who somehow reduce their unforced error rates by 10% in the deciding set, but he leads the rest of the pack, cutting down his mistakes by more than the tour average.

The third metric shown here--forehands as a percentage of all groundstrokes--is simply a curiosity. There's no right or wrong way to choose strokes, at least not at the level of the whole tour. As we saw last week, Medvedev and Zverev go for backhands on the plus-one shot more than anyone else, because they are in the unusual position that it might really be their stronger option. If a player improves his ground game in the fifth set--and this is nothing more than a hypothesis--it might show up in the numbers as more shots from his preferred wing. None of these men show a dramatic shift in shot selection, but I can't help but notice that Medvedev hits a few more backhands in the final set than he did in the two of four sets it took to get there.

If Medvedev reaches a fifth set in tomorrow's semi-final against Zverev, he won't need this level of savvy to know what's going on. The German's tactics, whether by design or instinct, are abundantly clear. Zverev can turn a shootout into a war of attrition, with two fifth-set tiebreaks already in Melbourne and an astonishing record of 22 deciding sets won in his last 26 attempts. While it will doubtless be a grind, the Russian might just be able to use his opponent's passivity against him. Faced with the tiny margins of a grand slam fifth set, every edge is worth exploiting.

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How Coco Gauff Escaped a Trap of Her Own Making

Also today: Jannik Sinner’s near-unbreakability

Coco Gauff at the 2022 US Open. Credit: All-Pro Reels

Coco Gauff is not a pusher, but she can do an awfully good impression of one. In yesterday’s Australian Open quarter-final against Marta Kostyuk, the American coughed up 50 unforced errors against just 17 winners. The average rally lasted 4.6 strokes, a modest number that was rescued from marathon territory only by Gauff’s many unreturned serves.

Coco’s forehand, the usual culprit when things get messy, was on full display yesterday. While the stroke has shown signs of improvement–only 9% of them contributed to the unforced error tally, below both tour average and Gauff’s own standard–it remains loopy, and it gets ever-more cautious under pressure. Kostyuk was willing to go after the high-bouncing mid-court groundstrokes, often putting Gauff on the run. Fortunately for the American, her defense rarely deserts her. She eked out a three-hour, 7-6, 6-7, 6-2 victory for a place in the Melbourne semi-finals.

My impression watching the match was that Gauff put an unreasonable number of returns–especially forehand returns–in the middle of the court, not too deep, and that Kostyuk was punishing them. I was partly right: The Ukrainian forced Coco to hit forehand after forehand against the serve, more than two-thirds of her service returns all told. Gauff did indeed send more of those balls down the middle, closer to the service line than the baseline. And Kostyuk attacked… but to little avail.

Let’s get into the numbers. The Match Charting Project divides the court into thirds, both in terms of direction (forehand side, backhand side, and middle) and depth (shallow [in the service boxes], deep [closer to the service line than the baseline], and very deep). All else equal, shots deep and/or to the sides of the court are better, though of course they are riskier. Some returns will inevitably end up down the middle and shallow; the goal is only to avoid it when possible.

Here is how Gauff’s performance yesterday compared to tour average and her own typical rate of service returns that went down the middle and didn’t land close to the baseline:

RETURNS          Middle/Not Very Deep  
Tour Average                    34.0%  
Coco Average                    40.5%  
Coco vs Kostyuk                 43.7%

Indifferent return placement is nothing new for the American, and she left even more hittable plus-ones for Kostyuk than usual. It wasn’t as bad as last year’s US Open final against Aryna Sabalenka, when Gauff put more than half of her returns in the less effective zones, but Kostyuk is no Sabalenka when it comes to imposing her will with the serve.

Return placement matters. On average, tour players win 46% of points when they land a down-the-middle, not very deep return. When they put the ball anywhere else–closer to the baseline or a sideline–they win 56%. Gauff is a little better behind the weak returns, but for her career, the gap is still present: 47% versus 55%.

Except… that isn’t what happened yesterday!

RETURN OUTCOMES  Mid/NVP W%  Better W%  
Tour Average          46.2%      56.3%  
Coco Average          46.9%      54.8%  
Coco vs Kostyuk       60.0%      55.2%

When Gauff placed a return near a line, her results yesterday were typical. But Kostyuk was unable to capitalize on the rest. Among 88 matches logged by the Match Charting Project, Gauff has won 60% of those middle/not-very-deep returns only a dozen times, usually in blowouts.

Judging from the American’s performance on return, she could have made quick work of yesterday’s contest, too. The sticking point came on her own side of the ball, where her non-committal forehands didn’t work out as well.

Minus-ones

On the WTA tour, when the return lands in play, the server has nearly lost her advantage. A good first serve can give her a lingering edge, or a well-placed return can tilt the balance in the other direction, but overall, the point begins again as a neutral proposition. Servers win 52% of those points.

Gauff, on average, does a little better, converting her serve 53% of the time. There are signs she’s improving, as well. In the US Open final against Sabalenka, she won 55%, and in the Auckland final this month versus Elina Svitolina, she picked up 59%. Apart from lopsided matches, the high-50s are the best anyone can do on an ongoing basis: Iga Swiatek’s average is 57%, and Sabalenka’s is 55%.

Coco won 39% against Kostyuk.

Gauff’s lack of confidence in her forehand showed up in multiple ways. First, she didn’t use it as much as a plus-one weapon. She usually hits 57% of her plus-one shots from the forehand side, in line with tour average. Yesterday, that rate was just 51%, something that had more to do with her own choices than any return magic that Kostyuk conjured up.

Then, she didn’t do much with those forehands. The following table shows plus-one forehand rates (3F%), the percentage of plus-one forehands hit down the middle (FH Mid%), and the server’s winning percentage (FH Mid W%) behind those down-the-middle forehands:

PLUS-ONES          3F%  FH Mid%  FH Mid W%  
Tour Average     56.6%    29.9%      45.9%  
Coco Average     57.2%    35.0%      47.0%  
Coco vs Kostyuk  50.7%    39.5%      40.0% 

Gauff magnified her own tendency to go back down the middle with her second-shot forehand. It didn’t work, as she won just 40% of those points, compared to her typical rate of 47%.

Even beyond the plus-one, Coco just kept pushing the forehand. She went down the middle with 46% of her forehands, compared with her usual 37% and the tour average of 28%. She won barely one-third of the points when she did so, partly because of the nine unforced errors she racked up playing an already conservative shot. Two of those missed down-the-middle forehands came on back-to-back points when she could hardly afford them, taking her from 15-all to 15-40 when trying to close out the match at 5-3 in the second set.

In the end, as we’ve seen, Gauff’s defense saved her. She won more than half of Kostyuk’s serve points despite lackluster returning. Had she served just a little better–she missed six straight first serves in that 5-3 game–she would have finished the job an hour sooner. Had she attacked a bit more effectively with her second shots, even the off-day from the line wouldn’t have amounted to much.

To state the obvious: She’ll have to play better to beat Sabalenka in tomorrow’s semi-finals. One thing, at least, will work in Coco’s favor: She’ll have many fewer choices to make. The defending champion will dictate play and give her less time to think than Kostyuk did. Gauff withstood the Belarusian barrage in New York, winning the US Open title despite a couple of detours against less aggressive players in the early rounds. The American can’t play tomorrow like she did yesterday, but thankfully, Sabalenka won’t let her.

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Jannik Sinner’s near-unbreakability

Jannik Sinner has lost his serve just twice en route to the Australian Open semi-finals. He has faced 28 break points and saved 26 of them.

Since 1991, when the ATP started keeping the relevant stats, he is the 26th player to reach the final four at a major with so few breaks of his own serve:

Tournament  Semi-finalist       BP Faced  Broken  
2013 USO    Rafael Nadal               6       0  
2018 Wimb   John Isner                 7       0  
2015 Wimb   Roger Federer              3       1  
1994 Wimb   Pete Sampras               9       1  
2015 AO     Novak Djokovic            11       1  
2014 Wimb   Roger Federer             12       1  
1997 Wimb   Pete Sampras              12       1  
2010 USO    Rafael Nadal              14       1  
2012 RG     Rafael Nadal              17       1  
2004 Wimb   Roger Federer             17       1  

Tournament  Semi-finalist       BP Faced  Broken  
2014 Wimb   Milos Raonic               9       2  
2011 RG     Novak Djokovic*            9       2  
2007 USO    Roger Federer              9       2  
2006 Wimb   Roger Federer              9       2  
2006 Wimb   Rafael Nadal               9       2  
2015 USO    Roger Federer             11       2  
2014 AO     Roger Federer             11       2  
1997 USO    Greg Rusedski             11       2  
1993 AO     Pete Sampras**            12       2  
2013 Wimb   JM del Potro              13       2  
2019 AO     Rafael Nadal              15       2  
2008 Wimb   Roger Federer             15       2  
2005 AO     Andy Roddick              15       2  
1998 Wimb   Pete Sampras              17       2  
2000 AO     Yevgeny Kafelnikov        22       2  
2024 AO     Jannik Sinner             28       2

* Djokovic won one round by W/O and another by retirement
** I don't have stats for Sampras's QF, but the final score suggests that he wasn't broken

Pretty good company! As the table makes clear, though, Sinner’s 28 break points faced is not so elite. In fact, the average major semi-finalist faces exactly 28 break points in his first five matches.

The Italian’s accomplishment, then, is saving so many. 26 of 28 is a 93% clip, and that is more rarefied air:

Tounament  Player      Faced  Saved   Save%  
2013 USO   Nadal           6      6  100.0%  
2018 Wimb  Isner           7      7  100.0%  
2012 RG    Nadal          17     16   94.1%  
2004 Wimb  Federer        17     16   94.1%  
2010 USO   Nadal          14     13   92.9%  
2024 AO    Sinner         28     26   92.9%  
2014 Wimb  Federer        12     11   91.7%  
1997 Wimb  Sampras        12     11   91.7%  
2015 AO    Djokovic       11     10   90.9%  
2000 AO    Kafelnikov     22     20   90.9%

Things will get tougher on Friday, when Sinner faces all-time-great returner Novak Djokovic for a place in the final. Then again, Djokovic failed to convert his first 15 break points against Taylor Fritz yesterday–maybe he was just preparing for the matchup with Sinner.

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Anna Kalinskaya At Her Peak

Also today: Upsets, (partly) explained; January 23, 1924

Anna Kalinskaya in the 2020 Fed Cup qualifying round. Credit: Nuță Lucian

Should we have seen this coming? Of all the surprises in the top half of the 2024 Australian Open women’s draw, Anna Kalinskaya’s run to the quarter-finals stands as one of the biggest. The 25-year-old was ranked 75th entering the tournament, and she had never reached the third round of a major in 13 previous main-draw attempts.

Had we looked closely before the tournament, we wouldn’t have found a title contender, exactly, but we would have identified Kalinskaya as about as dangerous as a 75th-ranked player could possibly be. She finished 2023 on a 9-1 run, reaching the final at the WTA 125 in Tampico, then winning the title at the Midland 125, where she knocked out the up-and-coming Alycia Parks in the semi-finals. 2024 started well, too: The Russian upset top-tenner Barbora Krejcikova in Adelaide, then almost knocked out Daria Kasatkina in a two hour, 51-minute match two days later.

The only reason her official ranking is so low is that she missed nearly four months last summer to a leg injury that she picked up in the third round in Rome. Her two match wins at the Foro Italico pushed her up to 53rd in the world, just short of her career-best 51st, set in 2022. The Elo algorithm, which measures the quality of her wins rather than the number of tournaments she was healthy enough to play, reflects both her pre-injury successes and the more recent hot streak. Kalinskaya came to Melbourne as the 31st-ranked woman on the Elo list.

These alternative rankings put a different spin on her path through the Australian Open draw so far. Here are the results from her first four rounds, in which she appeared to be the underdog three times:

Don’t be fooled!

Elo has some adjustments to make:

Round  Opponent  Elo Rk  Elo vRk  
R16    Paolini       31       37  
R32    Stephens      31       50  
R64    Rus           31      107  
R128   Volynets      31      139

Kalinskaya was hardly an early favorite–Stephens did her the favor of taking out Kasatkina, and Anna Blinkova (who lost to Paolini) eliminated the third-seeded Elena Rybakina. But given how the draw worked out, seeing the Russian’s name in the quarter-finals wasn’t so unlikely after all.

More luck

Kalinskaya has a dangerous forehand and a solid backhand, but she isn’t an aggressive player by the standards of today’s circuit. Her 14 matches logged by the Match Charting Project average 4.2 strokes per point, and that skews low because it includes three meetings with Aryna Sabalenka. Yesterday’s fourth-round match against Paolini took 5.3 strokes per point, and the third-rounder with Stephens was similar.

By Aggression Score, the 25-year-old rates modestly below average, at -17 in rallies and -15 on returns. While she doesn’t have any weaknesses that prevent her from ending points earlier, she’s more comfortable letting the rally develop. When Paolini played along, the results were remarkable: 32 points reached seven shots or more yesterday, and Kalinskaya didn’t end any of them with an unforced error.

The downside of such a game style is that a lot of opponents won’t be so cooperative. Last fall, the Russian lost back-to-back-to-back matches against Ekaterina Alexandrova, Viktoria Hruncakova, and Ashlyn Krueger, three women who opt for big swings and short points. By contrast, consider the Rally Aggression Scores of the quartet Kalinskaya has faced in Melbourne:

Round  Opponent  AggScore  
R16    Paolini         -5  
R32    Stephens       -16  
R64    Rus            -59  
R128   Volynets       -38

Paolini and Stephens have roughly similar profiles to Kalinskaya’s own; Rus and Volynets are even more conservative.

This isn’t just a convenient narrative: Kalinskaya really is better against more passive players. She has played 118 career tour-level matches against women with at least 20 matches in the charting database. Sort them by Rally Aggression Score and separate them into four equal bins, and the Russian’s preferences become clear:

AggScore Range  Match Win%  
57 to 175            35.7%  
0 to 56              46.4%  
-27 to -1            50.0%  
-137 to -27          59.4%

If the whole tour were as patient as she is, the Russian would already be a household name.

Alas, it’s rare to draw four straight players as conservative as the bunch Kalinskaya has faced in Melbourne. And having reached the quarter-finals, her luck has run out. Her next opponent is Qinwen Zheng, who has a career Aggression Score of 27 and upped that number in 2023. It could be worse–fellow quarter-finalists Sabalenka and Dayana Yastremska are triple-digit aggressors–but it is a different sort of challenge than she has faced at the tournament so far.

To win tomorrow, Kalinskaya will need to play as well as she has for the last few months, only a couple of shots earlier in the rally. Otherwise, Zheng will end points on her own terms, and thousands of potential new fans will be convinced that Kalinskaya really is just the 75th best player in the world.

* * *

Why are upsets on the rise?

Only four seeds, and two of the top eight, survived to the Australian Open women’s quarter-finals. Many of the top seeds lost early. This feels like a trend, and it isn’t new.

One plausible explanation is that the field keeps getting stronger. Top-level players now develop all over the world, and coaching and training techniques continue to improve. There are few easy, guaranteed matches, even if Iga Swiatek and Aryna Sabalenka usually(!) make it look that way. I believe this is part of the story.

Another component, I suspect, is the shift in playing styles. I noted a couple of weeks ago when writing about Angelique Kerber is that WTA rally lengths have steadily declined in the last decade. In 2013, the typical point lasted 4.7 strokes; it’s now around 4.3. Shorter points are caused by more risk-taking. Risks don’t always work out, full-power shots go astray, and the better-on-paper player doesn’t always win.

In 2019, I tested a similar theory about men’s results. I split players in four quartiles based on Aggression Score and tallied the upset rate for every pair of player types. When two very aggressive players met, nearly 39% of matches resulted in upsets, compared to 25% when two very passive players met. The true gap isn’t quite that big: given the specific players involved, there should have been a few more upsets among the very aggressive group. But even after adjusting for that, it remained a substantial gap.

It stands to reason that the story would be the same for women. Instead of Aggression Score, I used average rally length. I doubt there’s much difference. I didn’t intend to change gears, I just got halfway through the project before checking what I did the first time.

The most aggressive quartile (1, in the table below) are players who average 3.6 shots per rally or less. The next group (2) ranges from 3.7 to 4.0, then (3) from 4.1 to 4.5, and finally (4) 4.6 strokes and up. The following table shows the frequency of upsets (Upset%) and how the upset rate compares to expectations (U/Exp) for each pair of groups:

Q1  Q2  Upset%  U/Exp  
1   1    40.7%   1.07  
2   1    36.2%   0.99  
2   2    35.7%   0.99  
3   1    35.1%   0.93  
3   2    35.5%   0.97  
3   3    40.9%   1.07  
4   1    37.6%   1.03  
4   2    36.6%   1.02  
4   3    34.6%   0.95  
4   4    34.7%   0.97

(If you look back to the 2019 study, you’ll notice that I did almost everything “backwards” this time — swapping 1 for 4 as the label for the most aggressive group, and calculating results as favorite winning percentages instead of upsets. Sorry about that.)

Matches between very aggressive players do, in fact, result in more upsets than expected. It’s not an overwhelming result, partly because it’s only 7% more than expected, and partly because matches between third-quartile players–those with average rally lengths between 4.1 and 4.5–are just as unexpectedly unpredictable.

I don’t know what to make of the latter finding. I can’t think of any reasonable cause for that other than chance, which casts some doubt on the top-line result as well.

If the upset rate for matches between very aggressive players is a persistent effect, it would give us more upsets on tour today than we saw a decade ago. An increasing number of players fit the hyper-aggressive mold, so there are more matchups between them. The logic seems sound to me, though it may be the case that other sources of player inconsistency outweigh a woman’s particular risk profile.

* * *

January 23, 1924: Debuts and dropshots

Men’s tennis ruled at the early Australian Championships. The tournament had been held since 1905 (as the “Australasian” Championships), but there was no women’s singles until 1922. On January 23rd, midway through the 1924 edition, the press corps was preoccupied with the severity of Gerald Patterson’s sprained ankle and the question of whether Ian McInnes had been practicing.

James O. Anderson, the 1922 singles champion who would win the 1924 edition as well, introduced what was then–at least to the Melbourne Argus–an on-court novelty:

He has developed a new stroke since he last played in Melbourne, and it has proved successful. On the back of the court he makes a pretence of sending in a hard drive, but with a delicate flick of the wrist he drops the ball just over the net, leaving his opponent helpless 30 feet away.

A veritable proto-Alcaraz, was James O.

For the few fans who weren’t solely focused on Australia’s Davis Cuppers, a superstar was emerging before their eyes. Also on the 23rd, 20-year-old Daphne Akhurst made quick work of Violet Mather, advancing to the semi-finals in her first appearance at the Championships.

Akhurst wouldn’t go any further, unable to withstand the heavy forehand of Esna Boyd in the next round. But it was nonetheless a remarkable debut: She won both the women’s and the mixed doubles titles. The correspondent for the Melbourne Age, recapping the mixed final, could hardly contain his admiration:

Miss Akhurst–an artist to her finger tips–belied her delicate mid-Victorian appearance that suggested that she had slipped out of one of Jane Austen’s books by sifting out cayenne pepper strokes from a never-failing supply.

Daphne and Jack Willard–“who ran for every ball, and continued running after he played the ball”–defeated Boyd and Gar Hone in straight sets.

The pair of championships was a harbinger of things to come. Between 1925 and 1931, Akhurst would win five singles titles (losing only in 1927 when she withdrew), four more in the women’s doubles, and another three mixed. The only thing that could stop her were the customs of the day: She married in 1930 and retired a year later. Tragically, she died from pregnancy complications in 1933, at the age of 29.

Daphne is best known these days as the name on the Australian Open women’s singles trophy. For the next several years, there will be many more Akhurst centennials to celebrate.

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