Category: Backhands

Does Mpetshi Perricard’s Backhand Even Matter?

Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard in Basel, playing a longer rally than usual.
Credit: Skyscraper2010

The story of last week’s tournament in Basel was the blistering service performance of Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard. The six-foot, eight-inch Frenchman racked up 109 aces in five matches, including more than one-third of his service points in Sunday’s final against Ben Shelton.

Mpetshi Perricard is a big server straight out of central casting. He can nail the corners at 150 miles per hour; on Sunday he hit one second serve at 146. He puts plenty of mustard on his groundstrokes as well. He often plays a high-risk brand of baseline tennis, recognizing that with a serve like his, he only needs to break once or twice–or just pick off a couple of return points in the tiebreak.

The Frenchman’s rapid rise through the ranks also fits his style. For a big server, wins can come in batches, when conditions–or, simply, tiebreak luck–are on his side. After an unexpected breakthrough on clay in Lyon, Mpetshi Perricard upset Sebastian Korda (in four tiebreaks!) and reached the second week at Wimbledon. Basel played faster than any tour event this year, and he took advantage. In between, he suffered through a 1-7 stretch in which he lost five straight tiebreaks and saw his double-fault rate balloon into double digits.

Much of Mpetshi Perricard’s future success will depend on his ability to handle these ups and downs. So far, he has struggled a bit to avoid the bad patches that spell doom for one-dimensional players. In his limited tour-level action, he has won more service points (70.2%) than anyone except Jannik Sinner. Yet five men hold more reliably than the Frenchman does, even after an unbroken week in Basel. The successes of Milos Raonic and John Isner–and even Shelton last year–come from playing better than usual under pressure, something Mpetshi Perricard has yet to consistently demonstrate.

I do love talking about servebots serving service aces. But while everybody raves about the GMP serve, I keep thinking about the backhand.

On the one hand

Mpetshi Perricard is now the fourth-highest ranked man with a one-handed backhand. His shot is nothing like the graceful, big-backswing, Federer- and Gasquet-inspired strokes of Grigor Dimitrov and Lorenzo Musetti. He often does little more than set up the racket to block the ball back. Strong as he is, the resulting flat shot can be much more than a mere defensive maneuver.

A few generations ago, it was standard to see big servers with one-handers. Think Richard Krajicek or Greg Rusedski; you might even put Pete Sampras in that category. More recently, Ivo Karlovic sported a one-handed backhand, though he mostly hit slices. Christopher Eubanks fits a broadly similar mold. Now, though, one-handers are dying breed, with just nine representatives in the top 100 of the ATP rankings.

Unlike Musetti or Stefanos Tsitsipas, Mpetshi Perricard isn’t likely to inspire the next generation of one-handed stars. No one is going to call this guy a throwback. On a good serving day, the Frenchman’s highlight reel features barely any groundstrokes at all.

What, then, do the numbers say? Is the Mpetshi Perricard backhand any good? Would he be better off with a two-hander like Raonic’s, Isner’s, or Reilly Opelka’s? Or, to return to the question I started with: For someone who specializes in ending rallies before they begin, does his backhand even matter?

Safely hidden

When the Frenchman’s game plan is working, his backhand is tucked away, out of sight. No backhands are necessary when the serve doesn’t come back, and when he controls the point, he prefers the forehand. Setting aside service returns, few players avoid their backhands as scrupulously as Mpetshi Perricard does.

The average ATPer hits 44% of their groundstrokes from the backhand side. Here are the most backhand-shy men with at least 15 matches in the Match Charting Project database, along with some other big servers of note:

Player                      BH/GS  
Ivo Karlovic                30.1%  
Jack Draper                 32.5%  
Ryan Harrison               35.2%  
Thiago Monteiro             35.5%  
Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard  35.5%  
Jaume Munar                 36.1%  
Vasek Pospisil              36.4%  
Alejandro Tabilo            37.1%  
Alexei Popyrin              37.3%  
Guido Pella                 37.4%  
Ben Shelton                 37.6%  
Maxime Cressy               37.9%  
…                                  
Christopher Eubanks         38.9%  
Matteo Berrettini           41.1%  
Milos Raonic                42.9%  
-- Average                  44.0%  
John Isner                  44.3%  
Reilly Opelka               45.6%  
Greg Rusedski               46.2%  
Nick Kyrgios                46.8%  
Pete Sampras                47.7%  
Richard Krajicek            48.3%  
Goran Ivanisevic            51.1%  
Mark Philippoussis          52.1%

Backhands per groundstroke is not the easiest stat to parse, because it is the product of so many different factors. Nearly everyone would like to keep their number low, so it’s partly a function of footwork and anticipation. (And sheer willingness to hit forehands from outlandish positions.) But it is also influenced by opponents, who will work more or less hard to find the backhand. Mpetshi Perricard’s place on this list, then, could be telling us various things. He hits his forehand when he can, and his movement is good enough to make it happen. Opponents might not be trying as hard as they could to force a backhand.

Yet another factor is how comfortable the player is with their slice. GMP hits his quite a bit, meaning that he unleashes the flat one-hander that much more rarely. The typical tour player hits their flat or top-spin backhand on 35% of groundstrokes. The Frenchman comes in at 25%, not as often as his most extreme peers, but in line with other big servers:

Player                      not-slice-BH/GS  
Ivo Karlovic                           6.1%  
Daniel Evans                          11.6%  
Milos Raonic                          20.2%  
Maxime Cressy                         20.4%  
Matteo Berrettini                     21.3%  
Grigor Dimitrov                       22.7%  
Corentin Moutet                       23.3%  
Christopher Eubanks                   23.6%  
Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard            25.2%  
Alexei Popyrin                        26.3%  
...
Bernard Tomic                         27.9%  
John Isner                            28.0%  
Ben Shelton                           28.5%  
Reilly Opelka                         31.5%  
-- Average                            34.7%

All of this is to say: Mpetshi Perricard hardly leans on the flat backhand. His serve keeps point short, and his preferences are for other shots. In the 138 points of the Basel final, he hit only 28 flat backhands, six of them on service returns.

Backhand impact

When the Frenchman is forced to hit a backhand (or chooses to–anything’s possible, I guess), the results aren’t great. When he goes for the flat backhand, he wins 43% of points, compared to a tour average of 49%. He takes more risks than his peers, but not overwhelmingly so: 9% of his one-handers end in a winner or forced error, while 12% are unforced errors. (Tour norms are 8% and 9%, respectively.)

These outcomes aren’t as extreme as his preferences. Of about 200 players with as many non-slice backhands in the MCP database, Mpetshi Perricard’s 43% comes in 21st from the bottom. Compared to other big servers, that win rate is positively respectable:

Player                      W/FE%   UFE%  inPointsWon%  
John Isner                   6.9%  12.8%         35.8%  
Milos Raonic                 7.3%  12.5%         40.4%  
Matteo Berrettini            4.8%  10.4%         42.5%  
Andy Roddick                 5.5%   7.8%         42.6%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime        6.0%   9.9%         43.4%  
Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard   8.9%  12.6%         43.5%  
Ben Shelton                  6.2%  11.1%         43.8%  
Nick Kyrgios                 7.9%  10.7%         43.9%  
Kevin Anderson               7.6%  11.0%         44.1%  
Hubert Hurkacz               6.2%  10.0%         45.6%  
-- Average                   7.3%   9.0%         48.6%  
Jack Draper                  6.5%   5.7%         49.1%

Against this group, the Frenchman’s winner (and forced error) rate really stands out. Given the outcomes when he doesn’t go for it, it’s possible he should be even more aggressive than he already is. Master tactician Milos Raonic took a similar tack, piling up as many unforced errors as GMP does, but without quite as many winners.

The picture is less rosy when we look at slice backhands. As noted, Mpetshi Perricard hits a lot of them–close to one-third of his groundstrokes from that wing. When he does, he wins 33% of points, compared to 42% for his peers. Only a handful of players have posted such low slice-backhand win rates, and they are mostly the names you would expect:

Player                      W/FE%   UFE%  inPointsWon%  
John Isner                   1.5%  11.1%         27.3%  
Christopher Eubanks          1.6%  10.7%         30.2%  
Kevin Anderson               3.2%   6.5%         31.4%  
Nicolas Jarry                4.0%  13.2%         32.7%  
Ivo Karlovic                 3.5%  12.0%         32.8%  
Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard   3.1%   3.9%         33.1%  
Ben Shelton                  2.0%   7.1%         33.3%  
...
Nick Kyrgios                 4.2%   6.1%         35.6%  
Felix Auger-Aliassime        3.6%   8.2%         38.1%  
Hubert Hurkacz               2.7%   3.9%         38.1%  
Milos Raonic                 4.7%   9.4%         40.3%  
Matteo Berrettini            2.8%   9.0%         41.5%  
-- Average                   3.3%   5.4%         41.6%

The Frenchman doesn’t miss much. Why just keep the ball in play, though, if you’re likely to lose the point anyway? By hitting so many slices, Mpetshi Perricard makes his flat-backhand numbers look better, but he probably doesn’t pick up any points by making the trade. Prolonging the point is a good strategy if you’re Casper Ruud–or, really, about 80% of the guys on tour. But if you play like GMP, it’s better to go big.

This is one way in which the one-hander may cost him. The two-handed backhand is particularly valuable in its ability to block overpowering shots without retreating to a fully defensive mode. While players with one-handers try to achieve the same thing with a slice, the stats tell us that it’s a poor imitation. The Frenchman’s in particular isn’t doing him any favors.

So, does it even matter?

Mpetshi Perricard doesn’t hit that many backhands, and he isn’t that much worse than average when he does. But, the margins in tennis are small, and the margins for big servers are smaller still. In 26 tour-level matches this year through the Basel final, GMP won exactly 50% of his points. (Not 50.1%, not 49.9%–50% on the dot.) Five players in the top 20 win 50.8% or less. That’s how close the Frenchman is to an even bigger breakthrough.

My backhand potency (BHP) stat quantifies the impact that each player’s (non-slice) backhands have on their broader results. The stat measures how often a shot ends the point in either direction, as well as what happens on the shot after that. Based on the matches we’ve charted this year, GMP’s BHP per 100 backhands stands at -4.3, one of the lower numbers on tour for players with at least 10 charted matches from the last 52 weeks:

Player                      BHP/100  
Nicolas Jarry                  -6.9  
Felix Auger Aliassime          -4.6  
Tallon Griekspoor              -4.6  
Flavio Cobolli                 -4.3  
Giovanni Mpetshi Perricard     -4.3  
Alexei Popyrin                 -4.2  
Dominic Thiem                  -4.1  
Botic Van De Zandschulp        -3.5  
Matteo Berrettini              -3.1  
Ben Shelton                    -2.4  
Stefanos Tsitsipas             -2.4

What does this mean for the bottom line? -4.3 BHP is equivalent to about -3 points per 100 backhands. Since he doesn’t hit many backhands, that’s about -1.1 per 100 points.

My best estimate, then, is that if we magically replaced the Frenchman’s backhand with a neutral one–say, that of Arthur Fils–he’d pick up 1.1 more points per 100. Instead of winning 50% of points at tour level, he’d win 51.1%. That isn’t good enough to crack the top 10, but it would probably get him into the top 20.

Quantifying the impact of slices is tougher, because the more conservative shot is less likely to end the point immediately, or even on the next shot. If we figure that Mpetshi Perricard’s slice is roughly the same distance below average as his flat backhand, that’s another 0.5 or 0.6 points per 100 he could gain by acquiring a tour-average shot. Daniil Medvedev has hung in the top five in the ATP rankings while winning 51.9% of points. Stringing all of these assumptions together, we can start to see how a capably-backhanded GMP could reach that level.

The bad news for the Frenchman is that climbing the ranks is hard. Mpetshi Perricard is the worst returner in the top 50, and it isn’t even close. He breaks in about 10% of his return games; no one else is below 14%. Earlier this year, I wrote about the similar challenges facing Ben Shelton: Historically, a lot of players have arrived on tour with big serves, huge potential, and tons of hype. Few of them have been able to shore up their weak points enough to crack the top ten, let alone achieve greater feats.

The good news: There is so much room for improvement. Even without polishing the strokes themselves, it’s possible that a more aggressive set of tactics could win him a few more points on return. In yesterday’s loss to Karen Khachanov, the Frenchman won the first set despite picking off just two of 37 return points. One-dimensional servebot or not, he can learn to do better than that.

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The Downward Slide of Stefanos Tsitsipas’s Backhand Return

Stefanos Tsitsipas ahead of the 2023 US Open. Credit: Hameltion

Yesterday in Indian Wells, Jiri Lehecka knocked out Stefanos Tsitsipas with a masterclass of precision power hitting. The Czech tallied 27 winners to Tsitsipas’s 8, and that’s only after a belated burst of energy from the Greek in the second set. When I wrote about Lehecka in January, I chided him for an “excess of self-restraint,” hitting too many balls down the middle to take full advantage of his baseline weapons. He avoided that trap yesterday, and Tsitsipas paid the price.

Still, Lehecka didn’t seize upon every exploitable edge. The Tsitsipas backhand, pretty as it is, is a bit cumbersome, often leaving him slow to react. The time he needs to unleash the one-hander is a key reason why Stef is one of the most surface-sensitive players on tour, preferring courts that give him an extra split-second to prepare. Indian Wells plays slow for a hard-court event, but it’s hardly the same as the Monte-Carlo dirt. Combined with Lehecka’s power, a hard court has the potential to expose the Greek’s weaker side.

Lehecka generally stuck to the routine, sending both forehands and backhands cross-court, rarely doing anything in particular to force his opponent to hit a backhand. Still, the Czech made one concession to his opponent’s tendencies: He hit more serves than usual to the backhand. Lehecka’s favorite serve is the deuce-court slider wide, and he scored a few points blasting balls that Tsitsipas’s forehand couldn’t reach. But more often, he forced Stef to hurry the backhand, or chip a return.

The results were devastating. The Czech typically hits about half of his serves to each wing. 51% of his first serves and 52% of his seconds go to the backhand. Yesterday, he went that way 61% and 58% of the time, respectively. When Lehecka hit a first serve to the backhand, Tsitsipas got it back less than 60% of the time… and he won only 12% of those points. When a second serve went to the backhand, Stef got a more respectable 71% back, but still won just 14%. It was a short match, so we’re not talking about that much action: In nine return games, Tsitsipas won just four points when he had to make a backhand return.

The word is out–not that it was ever really a secret. Two weeks ago in the Acapulco quarter-finals, Alex de Minaur hit 90% of his serves to Tsitsipas’s backhand, beating the Greek for the first time at tour-level in eleven tries. While de Minaur’s persistence was unusual, it made a useful point. Stef–not long ago the third-ranked player in the world–has fallen out of the top ten, and one of the causes is something that every opponent can attack until he patches it up.

Serve this way

Yesterday’s match notwithstanding, Tsitsipas remains an elite server. He held 88.8% of his service games last year, the best mark of his career. His return numbers, though, are sinking. In 2021, he broke one-quarter of the time; last year, that number fell to 19.3%. By that metric, he’s in the bottom third of the ATP top 50.

It’s hard to pinpoint just one element of his return game that has gone astray, because everything is trending downwards. According to Match Charting Project data, he gets 66% of serves back in play–a below-average if acceptable figure–but wins just 42% of those points, one of the lowest marks on tour. Both rates are worse than his career averages of 68% and 44%, respectively.

The decline can’t be entirely blamed on a tour-wide tactical consensus, though Stef’s opponents aren’t helping. Here is a ten-match rolling average of the percentage of first serves hit to the Tsitsipas backhand on hard courts since late 2018:

(Clay courts add another wrinkle to the question, because everyone tends to get more serves to the backhand side on dirt. Four of Tsitsipas’s five most extreme matches by this metric were on clay.)

As always, it can be tough to gain an intuition with an unfamiliar tennis metric. 60% may not sound like a lot, but most servers cluster around the tour average of 52.5%. The servers who most frequently target the backhand side are clay-courters: Albert Ramos tops the list at at 63.5%, with Fernando Verdasco right behind him. At the other extreme, around 45%, are some right-handers, often those who can use height and/or wrist action to open the court with lots of slice. Daniil Medvedev and Andy Murray are two of the best-known proponents of this approach, and Medvedev is partly responsible for some of the troughs in Tsitsipas’s trend line above.

More to the point, the tour is taking aim at Stef’s backhand as much as it does anyone’s. Only Ivo Karlovic was faced with more backhand returns on hard courts. Denis Shapovalov, another one-hander, is in the same range. Again, the message about Tsitsipas’s backhand isn’t new, but it’s no accident that servers are picking on it at the same time that his return numbers take a nosedive.

Crash

Anyone who doesn’t attack the Greek’s backhand return these days is leaving points on the table. Here is another ten-match rolling average, this one showing Tsitsipas’s rate of return points won when his opponent lands a first serve to his backhand:

If you’ll forgive me some technical jargon, that’s… not good.

As we’ve seen, Tsitsipas won just 12% of those points against Lehecka. He won only 14% against Taylor Fritz in Australia and 16% in Los Cabos against Casper Ruud. Daniil Medvedev held him to 11% last fall in Vienna. And at the Tour Finals, Jannik Sinner hit 21 first serves in that direction. Tsitsipas won none of them.

Across 125 career charted hard-court matches, Stef has won 23.1% of return points on first serves to his backhand and 24.7% to his forehand. Since the start of 2023, those numbers have fallen to 20.6% and 23.4%. Every important return stat is trending downward, and the backhand numbers are declining fastest of all.

The only question remaining for Tsitsipas’s opponents is this: How much is too much? De Minaur set a new standard by going to the backhand with 90% of his serves, both first and seconds. That’s not unheard of on clay courts (Lorenzo Musetti has come close in two previous meetings with Stef), but it’s very unusual on a hard court. Only a handful of Tsitsipas’s opponents have topped even 70% in one direction.

Against most players, such a balance is probably appropriate. Too much to one side, and you lose the element of surprise. But because so much serving is split 50/50 (or 53/47), we don’t have much data to test the hypothesis. If there’s a 30% chance the server will go one way, will a returner really have an edge in the more likely direction? Against de Minaur, Tsitsipas figured things out quickly enough and inched over toward the backhand side. But not for long: The Aussie cracked one of his few forehand-side serves for an ace, far out of Stef’s reach. Tsitsipas is a good test case for servers looking to experiment: His success rate when he gets the return back in play is near the bottom of the table, so he’s unlikely to turn a match around just because he guesses right a few times.

I have no idea whether, at this point in the Greek’s career, his backhand return is something that can be fixed. In the short term, it will be easier for opponents to expose it than it will be for him to find a solution. Tsitsipas’s return numbers, already dire, could get worse before they get better.

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A First Look at the Down-the-Line Backhand

When executed correctly and deployed at the right moment, the down-the-line backhand is one of the most devastating shots in tennis. How valuable is it, and which players use it the most effectively? These are surprisingly complicated questions, and I don’t yet have solid answers. But the preliminary work, of determining the frequency with which players use the down-the-line backhand, as well as their success rate when they do, is illuminating in itself.

The Match Charting Project offers a lot of data on tactics like this. MCP charts record the type and direction of every shot. In a rally between right-handers, a down-the-line (DTL) backhand is simple to identify: a backhand from the backhand corner to the opponent’s forehand corner. (Or in MCP parlance, 3b1.) From the 2010s alone, the MCP has logged close to 100,000 DTL backhands, roughly evenly split by gender.

MCP charts also give us an idea of the bigger picture. We can identify opportunities to hit DTL backhands, in which a player might choose instead to hit a backhand in a different direction, or even to use a different shot entirely. A player who hits a lot of slices, or runs around the backhand to hit forehands, might hit a very high percentage of their backhands down the line, but those DTL backhands wouldn’t make up a high proportion of their total chances in that corner.

DTL opportunities

Let’s start with a look at those opportunities. The following table shows three rates for each tour, covering charted matches, 2010-present. The first rate is the percentage of backhand-corner opportunities that resulted in backhands. (For today’s purposes, I’m excluding slice backhands. DTL slices can be devilish, but they are an entirely different weapon. I’ve also excluded service returns, which present their own complications.) The second is the percentage of opportunities that results in down-the-line backhands, and the third is a combination of those two, the percentage of backhands from the backhand corner that were hit down the line.

Tour  BH/Opps  DTL BH/Opps  DTL/All BH  
ATP     63.7%        11.1%       17.4%  
WTA     73.6%        12.8%       17.4%

Women are much more likely than men to hit a non-slice backhand from their backhand corner. There are two reasons for that. First: men, on average, hit more slices, largely because a small number of men hit a lot of slices. Second, men are somewhat more likely to run around the backhand and hit a forehand from that corner. Because men hit fewer backhands in total, men also hit fewer DTL backhands as a percentage of all shots from that corner.

However, once they choose to hit a backhand, men and women go down the line at exactly the same rate, 17.4%, or roughly once per six backhands.

DTL results

Let’s look at the results of those DTL backhands. Here’s another table with aggregate ATP and WTA numbers, showing the percentage of DTL backhands that go for winners (including shots that induce forced errors), the percentage that are unforced errors, and the percentage that lead to the most important thing–ultimately winning the point:

Tour  Winner%   UFE%  Points Won%  
ATP     22.1%  18.1%        51.6%  
WTA     26.0%  22.2%        52.4%

Both men and women have a “positive” ratio of winners to unforced errors. But women hit a lot more of both. (As we’ll see, some women have eye-poppingly aggressive numbers.) And both genders, on average, end points more frequently with DTL backhands than they do with other shots, whether we look at all shots, or all backhands. The average non-slice backhand–counting those from every position, hit in every direction–goes for approximately 10% winners and 10% unforced errors.

The percentage of points won doesn’t look very dramatic, at 51.6% and 52.4% for men and women, respectively. Yet both numbers reverse the usual expectation for backhands. Backhands occur more often in defensive positions, so backhands are slightly more likely to occur in points lost than in points won, so the corresponding numbers for all backhands are below 50%. This is a good example of what makes shot analysis so difficult: Do DTL backhands result in more points won because they are a better tactical decision, or because players hit them more often in response to weak balls? It’s probably a combination of both, but more a reflection of the latter.

A lefty digression

I will get to some player-by-player numbers shortly, but first, let’s look at an interesting comparison between lefties and righties. I’ve long speculated that lefties–because they mostly face right-handed opponents–must learn to play “backwards.” While righties can whack crosscourt forehands at each other, a lefty rarely has the chance to do that. As a result, left-handers spend more time practicing unusual shots, like inside-out groundstrokes and the DTL backhand. That’s my theory, anyway.

Sure enough, left-handed men hit quite a few more DTL backhands than their right-handed peers. Righties go down the line on 16.9% of their backhands from the backhand corner, while lefties do so 21.4% of the time. Rafael Nadal plays a sizable part in this, as he represents a lot of the charted matches of left-handers, and he goes down the line 24.4% of the time, more than almost any other man. (Another lefty, Martin Klizan, is one of the few to be more extreme than Rafa, at 25.2%.) Still, a gap of several percentage points remains even if we exclude Nadal.

But this is hardly a physical law. Women show the opposite trend, in the aggregate. Right-handed women go down the line 17.6% of the time, while lefties do so 15.8% of the time. A few female lefties fit the mold of Nadal and Klizan, including Lucie Safarova (26.3%) and Ekaterina Makarova (26.1%). But in general, it is the most aggressive women–regardless of their dominant hand–who use the DTL backhand the most often. Jelena Ostapenko tops 27%, and Dayana Yastremska forces us to rescale the y-axis with a rate of 33%.

The DTL trade-off

I mentioned above a prime difficulty in evaluating shot selection. The most important measurement of any tactic is whether it results in more points won. If hitting more DTL backhands didn’t improve a player’s rate of points won, why would she do it? But if hitting more DTL backhands does improve her rate of points won, she should look to hit more of them, which means finding opportunities from slightly more challenging positions … which means winning points at a slightly lower rate. Push that logic to its extreme, and a superior tactic will no longer result in many more points won than the inferior tactic it replaces.

This problem, combined with the obvious fact that players have different skills and preferences, means that there’s not a strong relationship between a player’s rate of DTL backhands and their success–measured in points won–when they hit them. There is a very slight negative correlation (for both and women) between the frequency with which a player hits DTL backhands and the number of DTL backhand winners he or she hits, suggesting that there are limited opportunities to swing away and hit a clean winner. For women, there is no relationship, however, between the rate of DTL backhands and the rate of points won.

There is one minor exception to the barrage of non-relationships. For men, there is a weak negative correlation (r^2 = 0.13) between the rate at which the player hits DTL backhands and the rate of points won. That result tracks with the intuition described above, that as a player opts for the tactic more often, his results will decline–not because he plays worse, but because he is opting for the tactic in riskier situations. A player who goes down the line on 10% of his backhands is just picking the low-hanging fruit, while a player who does so 25% of the time is sometimes hitting an awfully low-percentage shot.

DTL by player: ATP

Thus, we might–very cautiously!–conclude a player who is winning a high percentage of points when he hits a DTL backhand should do so even more often. Here are 25 of the most prominent ATPers, sorted by the frequency with which they hit the DTL backhand:

Player                 DTL/BH   Wnr%   UFE%  Pts Won%  
Rafael Nadal            24.5%  12.1%  11.1%     54.7%  
John Isner              22.0%  23.2%  27.3%     38.2%  
Novak Djokovic          21.2%  16.7%  16.1%     54.2%  
Jo Wilfried Tsonga      21.0%  20.6%  27.7%     45.8%  
Denis Shapovalov        20.5%  20.1%  23.5%     49.1%  
Stan Wawrinka           19.1%  28.8%  26.8%     51.4%  
Kei Nishikori           18.8%  27.7%  19.1%     56.7%  
Dominic Thiem           18.4%  28.5%  28.2%     51.6%  
Fabio Fognini           18.3%  20.4%  23.8%     49.3%  
David Goffin            18.2%  23.5%  23.8%     49.5%  
Roger Federer           18.2%  25.5%  21.0%     53.2%  
Grigor Dimitrov         17.7%  27.4%  23.6%     50.5%  
Nick Kyrgios            17.7%  19.5%  23.5%     44.4%  
Andy Murray             16.8%  21.7%  16.5%     54.2%  
Richard Gasquet         16.6%  33.5%  23.1%     55.2%  
Juan Martin del Potro   15.5%  24.6%  15.7%     52.2%  
Alexander Zverev        15.3%  32.5%  19.0%     56.1%  
Gael Monfils            14.3%  25.9%  17.6%     54.7%  
Daniil Medvedev         14.3%  17.0%  16.9%     49.6%  
David Ferrer            14.2%  16.9%  18.1%     48.0%  
Stefanos Tsitsipas      14.1%  24.3%  22.9%     49.3%  
Borna Coric             13.6%  29.3%  24.1%     55.4%  
Kevin Anderson          13.3%  25.3%  24.9%     45.9%  
Roberto Bautista Agut   10.4%  17.3%  20.2%     46.3%  
Diego Schwartzman       10.3%  32.5%  22.3%     55.7%

If nothing else, these numbers show us that there are a lot of different ways to win tennis matches. Nadal hits a lot of backhands down the line, but he rarely ends the point that way. Only a bit further down the list, we find players who end the point with DTL backhands more than twice as often. The bottom of the table is filled with players who don’t win many points going down the line, but they are mixed with Diego Schwartzman and Borna Coric, two men who are very effective on the rare occasions they hit the more difficult shot.

DTL by player: WTA

There is no similar tour-wide correlation for women, but that doesn’t mean that each player’s shot selection is optimal. Here are the same stats for 25 prominent WTAers:

Player                DTL/BH   Wnr%   UFE%  Pts Won%  
Dayana Yastremska      33.7%  27.4%  24.7%     54.8%  
Jelena Ostapenko       27.1%  35.0%  33.6%     51.0%  
Serena Williams        25.2%  28.3%  19.6%     57.4%  
Belinda Bencic         21.6%  28.1%  14.6%     59.1%  
Aryna Sabalenka        21.2%  38.7%  25.5%     57.1%  
Madison Keys           20.4%  27.7%  39.9%     46.7%  
Simona Halep           20.1%  25.3%  21.7%     55.8%  
Venus Williams         19.2%  26.1%  19.7%     49.7%  
Bianca Andreescu       19.2%  22.6%  17.9%     59.7%  
Victoria Azarenka      19.1%  25.9%  16.2%     57.3%  
Karolina Pliskova      18.9%  26.6%  23.1%     51.6%  
Garbine Muguruza       18.1%  28.2%  18.9%     57.5%  
Maria Sharapova        18.0%  27.1%  21.4%     53.2%  
Naomi Osaka            17.9%  28.2%  27.7%     48.6%  
Johanna Konta          16.1%  33.4%  29.9%     53.6%  
Petra Kvitova          15.8%  30.9%  24.0%     54.0%  
Caroline Wozniacki     15.6%  25.5%  15.9%     56.8%  
Sloane Stephens        15.1%  25.9%  26.4%     53.2%  
Kiki Bertens           14.7%  21.6%  21.7%     49.0%  
Monica Niculescu       13.2%  29.7%  14.7%     62.9%  
Angelique Kerber       13.2%  26.7%  18.5%     56.2%  
Ashleigh Barty         13.1%  26.9%  29.0%     50.6%  
Marketa Vondrousova    11.5%  29.8%  18.5%     52.3%  
Carla Suarez Navarro   10.9%  33.1%  25.8%     55.9%  
Elina Svitolina        10.2%  27.6%  20.5%     53.9%

A dramatic example is that of Belinda Bencic, who hits more DTL backhands than almost anyone else on this list and is one of the most successful, in terms of points won, when she does so. It’s tough to avoid the hypothesis that she is squandering some opportunities to deploy this weapon. At the opposite extreme, Ostapenko and Madison Keys are extremely aggressive, hitting almost as many errors as winners, and in the case of Keys, winning considerably fewer than half of those points.

As it says on the tin, this is just a first look at the DTL backhand. Evaluating shot selection is hard, and quantifying the effects of shot-level tactics is even harder. But we can’t do it unless we’ve pinned down some of the basics, picking out some useful metrics and doing a first pass for any correlations that might (or probably don’t) exist. While it’s a long process, we’re one baby step closer to some answers.

Will a Back-To-Normal Federer Backhand Be Good Enough?

Italian translation at settesei.it

After Roger Federer’s 2017 triumph over Rafael Nadal at the Australian Open, I credited his narrow victory to his backhand. He came back from the injury that sidelined him for the second half of 2016 having strengthened that wing, ready with the tactics necessary to use it against his long-time rival. Since that time, he has beaten Nadal in five out of six meetings, suggesting that the new-and-improved weapon has remained a part of his game.

The Swiss is riding high after defeating Rafa once again in the Wimbledon semi-finals on Friday. But unlike in Melbourne two-and-a-half years ago, the backhand wasn’t responsible for the victory. In the Australian Open final, Federer’s stylish one-hander earned him 11 more points than in a typical contest, enough to flip the result in his favor. On Friday, Nadal had little reason to fear a Federer backhand that was only a single point better than average. The Swiss owes his semi-final result to some stellar play, but not from his backhand.

BHP redux

I’m deriving these numbers from a stat called Backhand Potency (BHP), which uses Match Charting Project shot-by-shot data to isolate the effect of each one of a player’s shots. The formula is straightforward:

[A]dd one point for a winner or an opponent’s forced error, subtract one for an unforced error, add a half-point for a backhand that set up a winner or opponent’s error on the following shot, and subtract a half-point for a backhand that set up a winning shot from the opponent. Divide by the total number of backhands, multiply by 100, and the result is net effect of each player’s backhand.

The average player hits about 100 backhands per match, so the final step of multiplying by 100 gives us an approximate per-match figure. BHP hands out up to 1.5 “points” per tennis point, since credit is given for both a winning shot and the shot that set it up. Thus, to translate BHP (or any other potency metric, like Forehand Potency, FHP) to points, multiply by two-thirds. In the 2017 Australian Open final, Federer’s backhand was worth +17 BHP, equal to about 11 points.

On Friday, Roger’s backhand was worth only +1 BHP. The best thing we can say about that is that it didn’t hold him back–the sort of comment we might have made as he racked up wins for the first 15 years of his career.

The semi-final performance wasn’t an outlier. In a year-to-year comparison based on the available (admittedly incomplete) MCP data, the 2019 backhand looks an awful lot like the pre-injury backhand:

Year(s)     BHP  
1998-2011  +0.1  
2012       +0.4  
2013       -1.8  
2014       -1.1  
2015       +1.3  
2016       -0.3  
2017       +3.5  
2018       +1.3  
2019       +0.8

There are still good days, like Fed’s whopping +16 BHP against Kei Nishikori in this week’s quarter-finals. But when we tally up all the noise of good and bad days, effective and ineffective opponents, and fast and slow conditions, the net result is that the backhand just doesn’t rack up points the way it did two years ago.

The backhand versus Novak

Federer’s opponent in today’s final, Novak Djokovic, is known for his own rock-solid groundstrokes. Like Nadal did for many years, Djokovic is able to expose the weaker side of Federer’s baseline game. The Serbian has won the last five head-to-head meetings, and nine of the last eleven. In most of those, he reduces Roger’s backhand to a net negative:

Year  Tournament        Result  BHP/100  
2018  Paris             L         -11.0  
2018  Cincinnati        L         -11.0  
2016  Australian Open   L         -12.6  
2015  Tour Finals (F)   L          -4.8  
2015  Tour Finals (RR)  W          +0.7  
2015  US Open           L          +0.8  
2015  Cincinnati        W          -2.2  
2015  Wimbledon         L         -13.4  
2015  Rome              L         -12.2  
2015  Indian Wells      L          -5.0  
2015  Dubai             W          -5.9  
…                                        
2014  Wimbledon         L          -3.1  
2012  Wimbledon         W          +9.6

Out of 438 charted matches, Federer’s BHP was below -10 only 27 times. On nine of those occasions–and two of the five since Fed’s 2017 comeback–the opponent was Djokovic. Incidentally, Novak would do well to study how Borna Coric dismantles the Federer backhand, as Fed suffered his two worst post-injury performances (-20 at 2018 Shanghai, and -19 at 2019 Rome) against the young Croatian.

It is probably too much to ask for Federer to figure out how to beat Djokovic at his own game. The best he can do is minimize the damages by serving big and executing on the forehand. The Swiss has a career average +9 Forehand Potency (FHP), but falls to only +4 FHP against Novak. In last year’s Cincinnati final, Djokovic reduced his opponent to an embarrassing -13 FHP, the worst of his career. It wasn’t a fluke: four of Fed’s five worst single-match FHP numbers have come against the Serb.

If Federer is to win a ninth Wimbledon title, he’ll need to rack up points on at least one wing–either his typical forehand, or the backhand in the way he did against Djokovic in the 2012 semi-final. Whichever one does the damage, he’ll also need the other one to remain steady. His forehand was plenty effective in the semi-final against Nadal, worth +12 FHP in that match. Against a player like Novak who defends even better on a fast surface, Federer will need to somehow tally similar results. It’s a lot to ask, and one thing is certain: No one would be able to complain that his 21st major title came cheaply.

The Federer Backhand That Finally Beat Nadal

Italian translation at settesei.it

Roger Federer and Rafael Nadal first met on court in 2004, and they contested their first Grand Slam final two years later. The head-to-head has long skewed in Rafa’s favor: Entering yesterday’s match, Nadal led 23-11, including 9-2 in majors. Nadal’s defense has usually trumped Roger’s offense, but after a five-set battle in yesterday’s Australian Open final, it was Federer who came out on top. Rafa’s signature topspin was less explosive than usual, and Federer’s extremely aggressive tactics took advantage of the fast conditions to generate one opportunity after another in the deciding fifth set.

In the past, Nadal’s topspin has been particularly damaging to Federer’s one-handed backhand, one of the most beautiful shots in the sport–but not the most effective. The last time the two players met in Melbourne, in a 2014 semifinal the Spaniard won in straight sets, Nadal hit 89 crosscourt forehands, shots that challenges Federer’s backhand, nearly three-quarters of them (66) in points he won. Yesterday, he hit 122 crosscourt forehands, less than half of them in points he won. Rafa’s tactics were similar, but instead of advancing easily, he came out on the losing side.

Federer’s backhand was unusually effective yesterday, especially compared to his other matches against Nadal. It wasn’t the only thing he did well, but as we’ll see, it accounted for more than the difference between the two players.

A metric I’ve devised called Backhand Potency (BHP) illustrates just how much better Fed executed with his one-hander. BHP approximates the number of points whose outcomes were affected by the backhand: add one point for a winner or an opponent’s forced error, subtract one for an unforced error, add a half-point for a backhand that set up a winner or opponent’s error on the following shot, and subtract a half-point for a backhand that set up a winning shot from the opponent. Divide by the total number of backhands, multiply by 100*, and the result is net effect of each player’s backhand. Using shot-by-shot data from over 1,400 men’s matches logged by the Match Charting Project, we can calculate BHP for dozens of active players and many former stars.

* The average men’s match consists of approximately 125 backhands (excluding slices), while Federer and Nadal each hit over 200 in yesterday’s five-setter.

By the BHP metric, Federer’s backhand is neutral: +0.2 points per 100 backhands. Fed wins most points with his serve and his forehand; a neutral BHP indicates that while his backhand isn’t doing the damage, at least it isn’t working against him. Nadal’s BHP is +1.7 per 100 backhands, a few ticks below those of Murray and Djokovic, whose BHPs are +2.6 and +2.5, respectively. Among the game’s current elite, Kei Nishikori sports the best BHP, at +3.6, while Andre Agassi‘s was a whopping +5.0. At the other extreme, Marin Cilic‘s is -2.9, Milos Raonic‘s is -3.7, and Jack Sock‘s is -6.6. Fortunately, you don’t have to hit very many backhands to shine in doubles.

BHP tells us just how much Federer’s backhand excelled yesterday: It rose to +7.8 per 100 shots, a better mark than Fed has ever posted against his rival. Here are his BHPs for every Slam meeting:

Match       RF BHP  
2006 RG      -11.2  
2006 WIMB*    -3.4  
2007 RG       -0.7  
2007 WIMB*    -1.0  
2008 RG      -10.1  
2008 WIMB     -0.8  
2009 AO        0.0  
2011 RG       -3.7  
2012 AO       -0.2  
2014 AO       -9.9  
2017 AO*      +7.8 

* matches won by Federer

Yesterday’s rate of +7.8 per 100 shots equates to an advantage of +17 over the course of his 219 backhands. One unit of BHP is equivalent to about two-thirds of a point of match play, since BHP can award up to a combined 1.5 points for the two shots that set up and then finish a point. Thus, a +17 BHP accounts for about 11 points, exactly the difference between Federer and Nadal yesterday. Such a performance differs greatly from what Nadal has done to Fed’s backhand in the past: On average, Rafa has knocked his BHP down to -1.9, a bit more than Nadal’s effect on his typical opponent, which is a -1.7 point drop. In the 25 Federer-Nadal matches for which the Match Charting Project has data, Federer has only posted a positive BHP five times, and before yesterday’s match, none of those achievements came at a major.

The career-long trend suggests that, next time Federer and Nadal meet, the topspin-versus-backhand matchup will return to normal. The only previous time Federer recorded a +5 BHP or better against Nadal, at the 2007 Tour Finals, he followed it up by falling to -10.1 in their next match, at the 2008 French Open. He didn’t post another positive BHP until 2010, six matches later.

Outlier or not, Federer’s backhand performance yesterday changed history.  Using the approximation provided by BHP, had Federer brought his neutral backhand, Nadal would have won 52% of the 289 points played—exactly his career average against the Swiss—instead of the 48% he actually won. The long-standing rivalry has required both players to improve their games for more than a decade, and at least for one day, Federer finally plugged the gap against the opponent who has frustrated him the most.

The Difficulty (and Importance) of Finding the Backhand

Italian translation at settesei.it

One disadvantage of some one-handed backhands is that they tend to sit up a little more when they’re hit crosscourt. That gives an opponent more time to prepare and, often, enough time to run around a crosscourt shot and hit a forehand, which opens up more tactical possibilities.

With the 700 men’s matches in the Match Charting Project database (please contribute!), we can start to quantify this disadvantage–if indeed it has a negative effect on one-handers. Once we’ve determined whether one-handers can find their opponents’ backhands, we can try to answer the more important question of how much it matters.

The scenario

Let’s take all baseline rallies between right-handers. Your opponent hits a shot to your backhand side, and you have three choices: drive (flat or topspin) backhand, slice backhand, or run around to hit a forehand. You’ll occasionally go for a winner down the line and you’ll sometimes be forced to hit a weak reply down the middle, but usually, your goal is to return the shot crosscourt, ideally finding your opponent’s backhand.

Considering all righty-righty matchups including at least one player among the last week’s ATP top 72 (I wanted to include Nicolas Almagro), here are the frequency and results of each of those choices:

SHOT    FREQ  FH REP  BH REP    UFE  WINNER  PT WON  
ALL             9.9%   68.1%  10.8%    5.8%   43.1%  
SLICE  11.9%   34.1%   49.5%   7.1%    0.6%   40.2%  
FH     44.9%    2.8%   69.0%  13.0%    9.8%   42.1%  
BH     43.3%   10.7%   72.2%   9.5%    3.1%   45.0%  
                                                     
1HBH   42.6%   12.0%   69.5%   9.3%    3.8%   44.2%  
2HBH   43.5%   10.0%   73.4%   9.6%    2.8%   45.4%

“FH REP” and “BH REP” refer to a forehand or backhand reply, and we can see just how much shot selection matters in keeping the ball away from your opponent’s forehand. A slice does a very poor job, while an inside-out forehand almost guarantees a backhand reply, though it comes with an increased risk of error.

The differences between one- and two-handed backhands aren’t as stark. One-handers don’t find the backhand quite as frequently, though they hit a few more winners. They hit drive backhands a bit less often, but that doesn’t necessarily mean they are hitting forehands instead. On average, two-handers hit a few more forehands from the backhand corner, while one-handers are forced to hit more slices.

One hand, many types

Not all one-handed backhands are created equal, and these numbers bear that out. Stanislas Wawrinka‘s backhand is as effective as the best two-handers, while Roger Federer‘s is typically the jumping-off point for discussions of why the one-hander is dying.

Here are the 28 players for whom we have at least 500 instances (excluding service returns) when the player responded to a shot hit to his backhand corner. For each, I’ve shown how often he chose a drive backhand or forehand, and the frequency with which he found the backhand–excluding his own errors and winners.

Player                 BH  BH FRQ  FIND BH%  FH FRQ  FIND BH%  
Alexandr Dolgopolov     2   45.7%     94.2%   43.3%     98.7%  
Kei Nishikori           2   51.1%     94.0%   38.9%     98.1%  
Andy Murray             2   41.0%     92.4%   46.5%     98.6%  
Stanislas Wawrinka      1   48.6%     92.1%   37.5%     98.0%  
Bernard Tomic           2   33.8%     91.7%   43.8%     97.9%  
Novak Djokovic          2   47.2%     91.7%   41.4%     98.5%  
Kevin Anderson          2   41.0%     91.5%   45.8%     96.6%  
Borna Coric             2   46.5%     90.7%   44.2%     96.9%  
Pablo Cuevas            1   41.9%     90.6%   54.5%     96.5%  
Marin Cilic             2   45.4%     89.7%   43.3%     97.2%  
                                                               
Player                 BH  BH FRQ  FIND BH%  FH FRQ  FIND BH%  
Tomas Berdych           2   41.6%     89.3%   44.2%     97.5%  
Pablo Carreno Busta     2   55.4%     87.8%   41.1%     93.5%  
Fabio Fognini           2   46.0%     87.4%   47.0%     96.1%  
Richard Gasquet         1   57.2%     87.3%   32.1%     96.8%  
Andreas Seppi           2   40.3%     87.2%   50.0%     93.9%  
Nicolas Almagro         1   53.6%     86.5%   39.3%     98.0%  
Dominic Thiem           1   38.5%     86.2%   50.0%     96.5%  
Gael Monfils            2   48.0%     85.3%   46.3%     85.3%  
David Ferrer            2   48.2%     84.9%   40.4%     97.1%  
Roger Federer           1   42.7%     84.8%   43.6%     94.5%  
                                                               
Player                 BH  BH FRQ  FIND BH%  FH FRQ  FIND BH%  
Gilles Simon            2   46.9%     84.6%   46.5%     94.6%  
David Goffin            2   45.4%     84.6%   45.7%     94.9%  
Roberto Bautista Agut   2   39.6%     83.3%   46.7%     98.4%  
Jo Wilfried Tsonga      2   43.5%     82.0%   44.5%     96.3%  
Grigor Dimitrov         1   41.4%     78.6%   39.4%     92.8%  
Milos Raonic            2   31.5%     63.5%   56.5%     94.3%  
Jack Sock               2   27.0%     62.5%   62.9%     96.3%  
Tommy Robredo           1   26.6%     56.1%   62.3%     88.4%

One-handers Wawrinka, Pablo Cuevas, and Richard Gasquet (barely) are among the top half of these players, in terms of finding the backhand with their own backhand. Federer and his would-be clone Grigor Dimitrov are at the other end of the spectrum.

Taking all 60 righties I included in this analysis (not just those shown above), there is a mild negative correlation (r^2 = -0.16) between a player’s likelihood of finding the opponent’s backhand with his own and the rate at which he chooses to hit a forehand from that corner. In other words, the worse he is at finding the backhand, the more inside-out forehands he hits. Tommy Robredo and Jack Sock are the one- and two-handed poster boys for this, struggling more than any other players to find the backhand, and compensating by hitting as many forehands as possible.

However, Federer–and, to an even greater extent, Dimitrov–don’t fit this mold. The average one-hander runs around balls in their backhand corner 44.6% of the time, while Fed is one percentage point under that and Dimitrov is below 40%. Federer is perceived to be particularly aggressive with his inside-out (and inside-in) forehands, but that may be because he chooses his moments wisely.

Ultimate outcomes

Let’s look at this from one more angle. In the end, what matters is whether you win the point, no matter how you get there. For each of the 28 players listed above, I calculated the rate at which they won points for each shot selection. For instance, when Novak Djokovic hits a drive backhand from his backhand corner, he wins the point 45.4% of the time, compared to 42.3% when he hits a slice and 42.4% when he hits a forehand.

Against his own average, Djokovic is about 3.6% better when he chooses (or to think of it another way, is able to choose) a drive backhand. For all of these players, here’s how each of the three shot choices compare to their average outcome:

Player                 BH   BH W   SL W   FH W  
Dominic Thiem           1  1.209  0.633  0.924  
David Goffin            2  1.111  0.656  0.956  
Grigor Dimitrov         1  1.104  0.730  1.022  
Gilles Simon            2  1.097  0.922  0.913  
Tomas Berdych           2  1.085  0.884  0.957  
Pablo Carreno Busta     2  1.081  0.982  0.892  
Kei Nishikori           2  1.070  0.777  0.965  
Roberto Bautista Agut   2  1.055  0.747  1.027  
Stanislas Wawrinka      1  1.050  0.995  0.936  
Borna Coric             2  1.049  1.033  0.941  
                                                
Player                 BH   BH W   SL W   FH W  
Bernard Tomic           2  1.049  1.037  0.943  
Jack Sock               2  1.049  0.811  1.010  
Gael Monfils            2  1.048  1.100  0.938  
Fabio Fognini           2  1.048  0.775  0.987  
Milos Raonic            2  1.048  0.996  0.974  
Nicolas Almagro         1  1.046  0.848  0.964  
Kevin Anderson          2  1.038  1.056  0.950  
Novak Djokovic          2  1.036  0.966  0.969  
Andy Murray             2  1.031  1.039  0.962  
Roger Federer           1  1.023  1.005  0.976  
                                                
Player                 BH   BH W   SL W   FH W  
Richard Gasquet         1  1.020  0.795  1.033  
Andreas Seppi           2  1.019  0.883  1.008  
David Ferrer            2  1.018  0.853  1.020  
Alexandr Dolgopolov     2  1.010  1.010  0.987  
Marin Cilic             2  1.006  1.009  0.991  
Pablo Cuevas            1  0.987  0.425  1.048  
Jo Wilfried Tsonga      2  0.956  0.805  1.095  
Tommy Robredo           1  0.845  0.930  1.079

In this view, Dimitrov–along with his fellow one-handed flame carrier Dominic Thiem–looks a lot better. His crosscourt backhand doesn’t find many backhands, but it is by far his most effective shot from his own backhand corner. We would expect him to win more points with a drive backhand than with a slice (since he probably opts for slices in more defensive positions), but it’s surprising to me that his backhand is so much better than the inside-out forehand.

While Dimitrov and Thiem are more extreme than most, almost all of these players have better results with crosscourt drive backhands than with inside-out (or inside-in forehands). Only five–including Robredo but, shockingly, not including Sock–win more points after hitting forehands from the backhand corner.

It’s clear that one-handers do, in fact, have a slightly more difficult time forcing their opponents to hit backhands. It’s much less clear how much it matters. Even Federer, with his famously dodgy backhand and even more famously dominant inside-out forehand, is slightly better off hitting a backhand from his backhand corner. We’ll never know what would happen if Fed had Djokovic’s backhand instead, but even though Federer’s one-hander isn’t finding as many backhands as Novak’s two-hander does, it’s getting the job done at a surprisingly high rate.

Measuring the Effectiveness of Backhand Returns

Italian translation at settesei.it

One-handed backhands can be beautiful, but they aren’t always the best tools for the return of serve. Some of the players with the best one-handers in the game must often resort to slicing backhand returns–Stanislas Wawrinka, for example, slices 68% of backhand first serve returns and 40% of backhand second serve returns, while Andy Murray uses the slice 41% and 3%, respectively.

Using the 650 men’s matches in the Match Charting Database, I looked at various aspects of backhand serve returns to try to get a better sense of the trade-offs involved in using a one-handed backhand. Because the matches in the MCP aren’t completely representative of the ATP tour, the numbers are approximate. But given the size and breadth of the sample, I believe the results are broadly indicative of men’s tennis as a whole.

At the most general level, players with double-handed backhands are slightly better returners, putting roughly the same number of returns in play (about 56%) and winning a bit more often–46.9% to 45.7%–when they do so. The gap is a bit wider when we look at backhand returns put in play: 46.5% of points won to 44.7%. While the favorable two-hander numbers are influenced by the historically great returning of Novak Djokovic, two-handers still have an edge if we reduce his weight in the sample or remove him entirely.

Unsurprisingly, players realize that two-handed backhands are more effective returns, and they serve accordingly. The MCP divides serves into three zones–down the tee, body, and wide–and I’ve re-classified those as “to the forehand,” “to the body,” and “to the backhand” depending on the returner’s dominant hand and whether the point is in the deuce or ad court. While we can’t identify exactly where servers aimed those to-the-body serves, we can determine some of their intent from serves aimed at the corners.

Against returners with two-handed backhands, servers went for the backhand corner on 44.2% of first serves and 34.8% of second serves. Against one-handers, they aimed for the same spot on 47.3% of first serves and 40.9% of second serves. Looking at the same question from another angle, backhands make up 61.7% of the returns in play hit by one-handers compared to 59.0% for double-handers. It seems likely that one-handers more aggressively run around backhands to hit forehand returns, so this last comparison probably understates the degree to which servers aim for single-handed backhands.

When servers do manage to find the backhand side of a single-hander, they’re often rewarded with a slice return. On average, one-handers (excluding Roger Federer, who is overrepresented in this dataset) use the slice on 53.9% of their backhand first-serve returns and 32.3% of their backhand second-serve returns. Two-handers use the slice 20.5% of the time against firsts and only 2.5% of the time against seconds.

For both types of players, against first and second serves, slice returns are less effective than flat or topspin backhand returns. This isn’t surprising, either–defensive shots are often chosen in defensive situations, so the difference in effectiveness is at least partly due to the difference in the quality of the serves themselves. Still, since one-handers choose to go to the slice so much more frequently, it’s valuable to know how the types of returns compare:

Return Type   BH in play W% SL in play W% 
1HBH vs Firsts        43.3%         37.6% 
1HBH vs Seconds       46.0%         44.1% 
                        
2HBH vs Firsts        46.8%         36.2% 
2HBH vs Seconds       48.6%         41.9%

(Again, I’ve excluded Fed from the 1HBH averages.)

In three of the four rows, there’s a difference of several percentage points between the effectiveness of slice returns and flat or topspin returns, as measured by the ultimate outcome of the point. The one exception–second-serve returns by one-handers–reminds us that the slice can be an offensive weapon, even if it’s rarely used as one in the modern game. Some players–including Federer, Feliciano Lopez, Grigor Dimitrov, and Bernard Tomic–are more effective with slice returns than flat or topspin returns against either first or second serves.

However, these players are the exceptions, and in the theoretical world where we can set all else equal, a slice return is the inferior choice. All players have to hit slice returns sometimes, and many of those seem to be forced by powerful serving, but the fact remains: one-handers hit slices much more than two-handers do, and despite the occasional offensive opportunity, slice returns are more likely to hand the point to the server.

These differences are real, but they are still modest. A good returner with a one-handed backhand is considerably better than a bad returner with a two-hander, and it’s even possible to have a decent return game while hitting mostly slices. All that said, in the aggregate, a one-handed backhand is a bit of a liability on the return. It will take further research to determine whether other benefits–such as the sizzling down-the-line winners we’ve come to expect from the likes of Wawrinka and Richard Gasquet–outweigh the costs.

Stubborn Richard and Fighting Flavia

We all know how great Richard Gasquet‘s backhand is.  It’s arguably the best one-hander in the game, and the down-the-line version is right up there with with any other men’s backhandweapon, one- or two-handed.

What has struck me in his last two matches is that, unlike virtually every other top player, he never runs around it.  Even Stanislas Wawrinka, another man with a claim on the “best one-hander” title, will frequently take several steps to get in position to hit a forehand from the backhand corner.

Gasquet doesn’t do that.  In 277 points yesterday, he ran all the way around a backhand once, and there were two or three other shots when he took a couple of steps to hit a forehand when he might have taken one to hit a backhand.  In other words, he’s totally comfortable hitting his backhand from anywhere on the court, against any spin, at any height, and he trusts it as his go-to offensive shot.

In my detailed stats tables, I added a chart last night showing shot types–how many each player hit, grouped into various categories.  Against David Ferrer, Gasquet hit 296 backhands (excluding slices) to 222 forehands, a ratio of 1.33.  Ferrer hit 274 to 297, a 0.923 ratio.  Ferrer is more typical.  He can hit solid crosscourt backhands all day long–even crush a down-the-line winner on occasion, but given the opportunity, he’ll move around it and hit a more powerful inside-out forehand.

Of the last five men’s matches I’ve charted, Gasquet’s backhand preference stands out.  Marcos Baghdatis vs Kevin Anderson: 0.58 for Baghdatis, 0.36 for Anderson.  Lleyton Hewitt vs Brian Baker?  0.72 for Hewitt, 0.86 for Baker. Tomas Berdych, 0.65, against Julien Benneteau, 0.73.  Against Denis Istomin, Andy Murray‘s ratio was 0.56.  Only Istomin is anywhere near Gasquet’s category, with a ratio of 1.15, and that may be more a testament to Murray’s ability to find his opponent’s backhand than anything else.

For all the beauty of Gasquet’s backhand, much of the time it is a simple rallying shot.  Move him deep into that corner, and he generally won’t hurt you. I’m not convinced all those backhands make up a wise tactical decision–perhaps more inside-out forehands would be in order.  Certainly, he’ll need to come up with something out of the ordinary when he faces Rafael Nadal on Saturday.

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From the day the draw was announced, Flavia Pennetta‘s quarter was considered the wide-open section of the field.  Except, until yesterday, nobody thought of it as Pennetta’s quarter.  Technically it was fourth-seed Sara Errani‘s to lose, which she promptly did, to Pennetta in the second round.  It was also considered fair game for Caroline Wozniacki … who lost in the third round.  Then it was the domain of rising star Simona Halep … another Pennetta victim.

Surely Flavia’s run ends tomorrow at the hands of Victoria Azarenka.  In the meantime, let’s take a moment to celebrate a few amazing aspects of her accomplishment thus far.

Ranked 83rd–and ranked outside of the top 100 only six weeks ago–it took a late injury withdrawal to get her into the main draw.  Now, she is only the 10th woman in the Open era to reach a Grand Slam semifinal while ranked outside of the top 80.  Just one previous US Open semifinalist–Angelique Kerber two years ago–was ranked so low.

Another remarkable aspect of Pennetta’s run is that she has reached her first Slam semifinal at the age of 31.  Only three women–Gigi Fernandez, Nathalie Tauziat, and Wendy Turnbull–reached their first Slam semi after turning 30.  (Fernandez did it while ranked outside the top 80, making her the proto-Flavia.)  Turnbull is the only first-time semifinalist to have done so while older than Pennetta is now, by a couple of months.  She accomplished that feat at the 1984 US Open.  Amazingly, it wasn’t Turnbull’s only moment in the spotlight–she reached the semis of the Australian a few months later, beating a young Steffi Graf along the way.  She even reached the quarters at the following year’s US Open.

Finally, we may marvel at the fact that Pennetta, once a top-ten player, did not reach a semifinal until this, her 41st slam.  Also near the top of the all-time leaderboard, but not a record.  Francesca Schiavone had played 41 slams before reaching her first semi in the French Open a few years ago.  Tauziat makes another appearance here; she needed 44 tries before winning five straight matches.  The most dogged of all WTA players must be Elena Likhotseva, who played 56 career Slams, not making it to the semifinal in her 46th try.

Most of these precedents jibe with our intuition that, no matter how hot she is, Flavia doesn’t stand much of a chance against Vika.  But a couple of these cases–Schiavone with her two deep French open runs, and Turnbull with her pair of late-career semifinals–suggest that this could be more than a one-off for the Italian.

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Rafael Nadal has yet to lose serve at the US Open, and has a string of 82 consecutive service holds going back to Cincinnati.  I plan to have more on this before his semifinal match.

Here’s a win-probability graph for yesterday’s Gasquet-Ferrer five-setter. And if you somehow missed it the last five times I linked to it, here are my detailed stats from that match.

I’ll chart one of the two men’s quarters today, though I’m not yet sure which one.  Keep an eye on my Twitter account, as I’ll post those stats after each set.

And last for today, here’s an example of thorough data collection that tennis organizations will almost certainly fail to follow.

The State of the One-Handed Backhand

Italian translation at settesei.it

Don’t write the eulogy just yet. The one-handed backhand isn’t the common sight that it used to be, but there are still plenty of them out there.  When the current generation retires, however, we might have an endangered species on our hands.  Here’s a quick look at the prevalence of the one-hander in today’s men’s game.

About 1 in 5 players (62 of the top 300) at the ATP and Challenger level use a one-handed backhand.  To focus more narrowly: 10 of the top 50, 14 of those ranked 51-100, 13 from 101 to 150, 9 between 151 and 200, and 8 each in ranges 201-250 and 251-300.

One-handed backhands are slightly more popular among righties than lefties.  Among the top 200, there are 28 lefties, six of whom (21.4%) have one-handers.   That compares to 23.3% among righties.

When we split the top 300 into quartiles by age, a distinct preference appears.  About 30% of the oldest half of the top 300 (those born in 1986 or before) use one-handed backhands: 23 of the oldest 75 and 22 of the next-oldest quartile.  Of the second-youngest quartile–those born between the beginning of 1987 and July 1989, there are only 10 one-handers, or 13.3%.  The youngest quartile is bleakest, with only seven one-handers among the 75 players. Six of the seven are Europeans, including the youngest man in the top 300, Dominic Thiem. The only non-European is the American Daniel Kosakowski.

To summarize more concisely if a bit less dramatically, the average age of those with one-handed backhands in the top 300 is 28 years, 63 days, while the average age of two-handers is 26 years, 103 days.  Given the number of second tier players clustered in the late-20s range, that is a bigger difference than it might sound.

Last year there were 137 matches at the ATP level between two players with one-handed backhands.  At all 137 of those matches, someone was heard to say, “Two one-handed backhands! You don’t see that much anymore.”